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THESIS

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE ADVISOR TRAINING, DOCTRINE, AND MANNING FOR 2015 AND BEYOND

by

Gunnar A. Spafford

March 2016

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR   after action report
AOR   area of responsibility
APOD   aerial port of debarkation
ATC   Advisor Training Center
ATG   Advisor Training Group
AUP   Afghan uniformed police

BAC   basic advisor course
BAH   basic allowance for housing
BAS   basic allowance for subsistence
BPC   building partnership capacity
BTT   border training teams
BTT   brigade training teams
BZO   battle sight zero

CLATT   coordination, liaison, assessment, and training teams
COIN   counterinsurgency
CMC   Commandant of the Marine Corps
CONUS   continental United States
CPG   Commandant's planning guidance
CT   counterterrorism

DISAM   Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management
DLAB   Defense language aptitude battery
DOD   Department of Defense
DRI   Defense Reform Initiative
DSG   Defense Strategic Guidance

EF-21   Expeditionary Force-21
ETT   embedded training teams

FID   foreign internal defense
FM   field manual
FPC   final planning conference
FPTT   federal police transition teams
FSF   foreign security force

GCC   geographic combatant commanders
GEF   Guidance for Employing the Force
GSA   Global War on Terror Support Assignment

HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
HRDP	human resource development process
HN	host nation
HR	high risk
IA	individual augment
IPC	initial planning conference
IRB	Institutional Review Board
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
JMD	Joint Manning Document
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Forces
MARADMIN	Marine administration
MARFOR	Marine Corps Forces
MARFORCOM	Marine Forces Commanders
MARFORRES	Marine Forces Reserve
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCCLL	Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
MCDP	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCSCETC	Marine Corps Security Cooperation Education Training Center
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MCSCG	Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
MCTAG	Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MHG	MEF Headquarters Group
MiTT	military transition teams
MMEA	manpower management enlisted assignment
MMOA	manpower management officer assignment
MOS	military occupational specialty
MPC	mid planning conference
MRX	mission rehearsal exercise
MTT	mobile training teams
NMS	National Military Strategy
NPTT	national police transition teams
NSS	National Security Strategy
OMLT	Operational Mentoring Liaison Team
PN	partnered nations
PoETT	port of entry transition teams
POI	program of instruction
POMLT	police operational liaison team
PTP	pre-deployment training program

PTT	police training teams
QDR	*Quadrennial Defense Review*
RC	regional command
RFF	request for forces
RMC	regular military compensation
RTN	requirement tracking number
SA	security assistance
SAT	systems approach to train
SC	security cooperation
SCEP	security cooperation engagement plan
SCETC	Security Cooperation Education Training Center
SFA	security force assistance
SFAAT	security force assistance advisor teams
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOP	standard operating procedures
SPOD	sea port of debarkation
T/O	table of organization
TIG	training instructor group
TP	TRADOC pamphlet
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMC MTT	United States Marine Corps military transition team

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I.   INTRODUCTION

We must also build and integrate the capabilities that can advance our interests, and the interests we share with other countries and peoples. Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.

—President Barack Obama

A.   THESIS RELEVANCE

Advising is the historical foundation for the past, present, and future. The past years have shown that the United States Marine Corps (USMC) does not always institute the hard lessons learned. The military is filled with great individual American heroes, and by working together, they have an opportunity to travel to beautiful countries and work with amazing people. A limited number of Americans are provided the opportunity to advise people in foreign nations. With the right people and training, America can "help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges" (White House, 2013, p. 2). The integration of military forces from different countries is now a reality. The role of advisor takes an exceptional person with a unique ability to understand indigenous people. That person is not a master in one subject but is knowledgeable in multiple areas. It is imperative to find the right people and provide them the right training to fulfill this nation's strategic goals.

Advisor teams today are conducting extensive training prior to deploying into a country or region that requires assistance. Their training is conducted at a Marine's parent command, as well as alternative locations, depending on the mission. This research is focused on the Basic Advisor Course (BAC), located at Fort Story, Virginia. The course is a three-week long program, and once completed, Marines graduating receive a free military occupational specialty (MOS) to certify the successful completion of the course. The command responsible for conducting the class wants to determine if any areas of the

course can be improved upon. This objective led to this thesis' research, which examines the training, doctrine, and manning of the advisor teams. Advising has advanced over the centuries, and defining key terms will provide a better understanding of how these terms are used today.

B. ADVISING TERMINOLOGY

Warfare is ever evolving; today; the world employs the flexibility of coalitions to fight battles, and rarely does one country fight alone. Coalitions are built to work together and share the costs of war. The American military and its international partners must work seamlessly to conduct actions, such as movement under fire, call for fire, and medevac's. The Marine Corps cannot afford to train only Marines who will, in turn, train only other Marines. Today, all Marines need to be prepared to teach members of foreign militaries also.

Commanders focus their units on training to win battles that will win the war. Marines spend the vast majority of their time training in the six warfighting functions of maneuver, fires, command and control, logistics, intelligence, and protection; however, something is missing. While the six warfighting functions provide detailed instruction for their categories, no current doctrine is shaping engagement with foreign partners. Adding a seventh function would address this need.

To understand how to build partner capacity, it is necessary to understand a few key terms. The first term is "security cooperation" (SC). According to Joint Publication 1-02, security cooperation is defined as, "all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. 221). SC is conducted in conjunction with allies to strengthen partnerships, build partner capacity, and provide access to partnered nations. Another set of policies that the United States (U.S.) government uses to assist the militaries of other states is security assistance (SA), which is managed by the State Department but administered by the Department of Defense

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(DOD). SA is a collection of programs that provides military equipment, training, and financing.

The second term is "security force assistance" (SFA). Joint Publication 1-02 defines security force assistance as "the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). SFA was developed in 2009 by the Army and Special Operations command. SFA is a subset of SC and the military apparatus of foreign internal defense (FID), and it "is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014b). This concept now applies to Special Operations Forces (SOF), the general purpose force, and civilian contractors.

The third term is "engagement." Joint Publication 1-02 defines engagement as the "routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States (U.S.) and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. 160). Engagement is how military forces got the job done in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Currently, engagement is not considered a warfighting function, and commanders do not have a Marine Corps doctrine to follow.

The final term that must be understood is "advising." Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines advising as "to give (someone) a recommendation about what should be done" ("Advise," n.d.). The term advisers became prominent during the Vietnam War. At the end of 1964, 23,000 advisors deployed to Vietnam to help train the South Vietnamese army "and while they were still called advisers at that point, they were in combat" (Woodward, 2014, p. 1). Woodward (2014) continues to state that by 1968, over 500,000 U.S. troops were fighting in what would be known as America's quagmire (p. 1). This escalation in the number of advisors may have stigmatized the term, given that so many troops moved into Vietnam and that their role changed over time. Understanding how advising has evolved to SC is important.

C.   IMPACT

SC is a fairly new term. It was "first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI)" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 1–1). Defense planning guidance has directed the services to include SFA as a core task, which implies the service's capability to train advisors (White House, 2012, p. 4). This guidance is tied directly to an increasing need for phase zero, steady state activities to build partner capacity, in addition to the need for advisors throughout the six-phase campaign construct. The six phases of military operations start at phase zero and end with phase five. They include shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to the creation of many different types of USMC advisor teams. Table 1 shows a sample of some of these teams.

Table 1.   List of Teams

TEAM LIST	
military transition teams	(MiTT)
embedded training teams	(ETT)
federal police transition teams	(FPTT)
national police transition teams	(NPTT)
police transition teams	(PTT)
border training teams	(BTT)
brigade training teams	(BTT)
mobile training teams	(MTT)
port of entry transition teams	(PoETT)
security forces assistance advisory team	(SFAAT)
Operational Mentoring Liaison Team	(OMLT)
Police Operational Liaison Team	(POMLT)
Afghan uniformed police team	(AUP)

A foreign security force (FSF) is the term the Marine Corps has developed as an all-encompassing term for all foreign units that require advisory team support. On September 23, 2014, the Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 472/14 announced the approval of the FSF advisor free MOS. This new MOS will have a direct impact on all future training and operations. FSF advisors must have extensive knowledge and experience in developing and influencing FSFs across the spectrum of

operations and conflict, particularly during steady-state activities and stability operations in a major campaign. From this point forward, all training/transition teams are referred to as FSF advisor teams or simply as advisor teams, unless quoted from other documents.

Advisor training, development, and management are essential for the Marine Corps to have successful programs to support defense planning. Only a few people have the experience as a team member with insight into the management and training of advisor teams, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, to provide the necessary knowledge for comprehensive research. Analyzing the implications and best practices for tracking, developing, handling, and allocating Marine advisors requires an additional study and is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The training teams can have a major impact on the Marine Corps' future. This study examines the history and best practices of FSF advisor teams to determine optimal training, doctrine, manning, and a course of action going forward. Supported by the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), this research focuses on determining the appropriate personnel and the training these personnel need to accomplish building partnership capacity (BPC) and SC requirements.

D.   THE AUTHOR'S MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE

The Marine Corps sent me to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Kenya, Maldives, Iraq, and Afghanistan as a U.S. ambassador to do my part to secure U.S. national interests. As President Obama stated in the *2010 National Security Strategy* (NSS), in each deployment, I did my part to "build capabilities while advancing America's interests." Although my part was small, my advisory skills developed from my first trip to Japan in 1994 to my last trip to Afghanistan in 2011.

To a young enlisted man, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Kenya were eye-opening compared to a small town in rural New England. Looking back, the Marines conducted many hours on maneuvers, rifle ranges, and tactics and did not focus as much on culture, language, or ethnic training. As a result, once we arrived in our area of operations, it took time to understand how to interact appropriately with our foreign counterparts. In all the countries, when we interacted with the local people and military

units, we would make mistakes that alienated our unit. It took time for the unit to understand how to interact with the local populace. Once units began to feel comfortable with our interactions with our foreign counterparts, it was time to rotate back home.

As an officer, my experiences in the Maldives, Iraq, and Afghanistan took me on a completely different path. Unlike my enlisted experiences prior to these deployments, more time was devoted to culture, language, and ethnic training to allow us to go into these countries with a little understanding of what to expect. For example, the Marine Corps tasked our infantry battalion to establish seven different advisor teams prior to going to Iraq to train and partner with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The teams' manning came out of the Battalion's table of organization (T/O) and received limited training. While deployed to Iraq with 2d Battalion, 24th Marines in Helmand Province, ranging from Ramadi to Fallujah, we spent much of our time advising and training the ISF. As the battalion coordinator for all seven teams, it was my first continuous exposure to working with members of a foreign military. Due to our training prior to deploying, it did not take as long to understand how to relate with the locals. I learned a lot from my experiences working with these teams, most importantly, how to interact with them. One after action report (AAR) or lesson learned that every team expressed was that they wanted more advisor training prior to deploying to another country.

Two years later, my parent unit, 3rd Marine Air Wing (MAW), selected me to fill the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) individual augment (IA) requirement in support of an advisory mission to Afghanistan. While this took me out of an important job at the MAW, I trained with a great team for three months prior to deploying. The Advisor Training Cell (ATC) located at the MEF received all the IAs for training and preparation for the forward deployed role. The MEF training lasted two months. The teams were later evaluated on their advisor skills for a 30-day training evolution at the Advisor-Training Group (ATG) in Twenty-Palms, California, just prior to deploying. During the deployment, I served as the assistant team leader and operations officer of a training team and established the 707th AUP team in regional command (RC) southwest in Afghanistan. I was fortunate that all my prior experiences prepared me for my assignment

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with the AUP. These experiences allow for a comprehensive review of the Marine Corps current advising program.

E.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research was developed in conjunction with MCSCG needs and the thesis advisor's requirements in the understanding of the current problem. This thesis attempts to provide insight to the following questions with the help of history, current practices, and detailed analysis.

1.   Primary Question

- Based on historical Marine Corps engagements and partnerships, what fundamental skills should be taught in the basic Marine advisor course?

2.   Secondary Questions

- What training document is needed to ensure continued success with engagement?

- How should Marines be assigned to FSF teams?

F.   SCOPE

This research analyzes the purpose and function of Marine Corps advisors from the 1900s onward. Following this historical background, previous and current management is examined to discern both efficiencies and deficiencies. Also, this thesis develops an AAR survey that allows MCSCG to implement changes in pre-training, training, and post-deployment training. Future researchers could use data from this project to explore what is needed for training second or third iteration advisors, or individuals with varying levels of experience on a team addressing advisor skills as a perishable skill.

G.   METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses the human resource development process (HRDP) by conducting interviews and reviewing archived materials, such as policies, doctrinal publications, current organizational models, and other literary information to gain a better

understanding of where advising falls in the spectrum of the six warfighting functions. Appendix A provides a list of IRB approved questions that were asked during the interview process. A thorough review of training team requirements, processes, and procedures identifies gaps in the training and manning process.

Chapter II discusses advising throughout history and how the USMC specifically has conducted training. Chapter III glances at the laws, strategies, and directives that shape engagement and conducts a literature review of previous studies. Chapter IV analyzes the training, doctrine, and manning of current processes, and Chapter V presents this research's conclusions and suggestions for future studies.

II. BACKGROUND

> In Sicily about … the spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse with as many troops as he could bring from the cities which he had persuaded to join. Calling the Syracusans together, he told them that they must man as many ships as possible, and try their hand at a sea fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in the war not unworthy of the risk.
>
> —Thucydides

A. INTRODUCTION

If doomed to repeat history, then why not spend more time learning from it? Military advising to help other countries improve their capabilities during both war and peace is not a new concept. As the quote states, a Spartan General Gylippus persuaded the Syracusans to build a navy because he knew that with a navy, he would be able to fight the Athenians on land and sea (Thucydides et al., 1996, p. 439). It is not the first time one country or nation helped another improve its military capabilities. In fact, many documented and undocumented instances have been recorded throughout history. This chapter covers two sections. The first discusses examples in which advisor events had history-altering effects, and the second examines how the Marine Corps has evolved to train teams to deploy as advisors.

B. ADVISING THROUGHOUT HISTORY

One exceptionally trained combatant can turn the tide of a conflict. This section analyzes five times throughout history when advising made an impact. Starting with the Peloponnesian war, which is one of the earliest known interventions in recorded history, four additional instances are reviewed in which America itself received, or employed advisors.

1. Peloponnesian War

The act of providing and receiving training between countries dates back to the Peloponnesian war, fought from 431 to 404 B.C.E. between the allies of Athens and the Spartan-led Peloponnesian league. In 414, Sparta decided to send "immediate aid to the

Sicilians, and naming Gylippus son of Cleandridas to the command of the Syracusans" (Thucydides et al., 1996, p. 416). One Spartan General, Gylippus, was sent to aid the Syracusans on the island of Sicily. According to Thucydides, Gylippus' leadership was critical to deal a devastating blow to both the Athenian army and navy, which sank 220 ships or about 66 percent of the Athenian naval fleet and killed 40,000 soldiers and sailors (p. 439). Gylippus was one superbly trained general who advised, trained, and educated the Syracusans, and as a result, changed the course of history. The Peloponnesian War happened almost 2,500 years ago, and yet lessons on the benefits of advising can be learned from this battle still today.

2. The American Revolutionary War

In 1777, with the aid of advisors, a rebel force comprised of militia, fought against a large more professional field army. That rebel force, fighting for its independence from the mighty British Crown, would later become the United States of America. The Continental military was a regular army; however, it was mostly made up of militias that did not constitute a professional army. The Continental Congress was able to secure advisors from other countries to help train the military, countries like Prussia where people like Friedrich von Steuben, a military officer who drilled the militias, greatly improved the soldiers' capabilities. Another advisor, Frenchmen Gilbert du Motier, marquis de La Fayette, served as a general and fought bravely in the Continental Army. Direct military assistance from foreign forces in the form of advisors, fleets, and ground troops provided decisive aid to America.

3. Banana Wars

America engaged in numerous small conflicts from around the end of the Spanish-American War in 1902 to the Good Neighbor Policy of the mid-1930s. The U.S. military fought battles on the islands of the Caribbean to the shores of Latin America. Marines would cynically refer to these military interventions as the Banana Wars (Langley, 1985. p. xviii). During that time, American foreign policy had four goals, one of which was to "support American investors in these underdeveloped agricultural countries" (Moskin, 1992, p. 149) of the Caribbean. In his book, J. R. Moskin (1992)

paints a portrait of why America was so dedicated to the region. "American financiers built railroads; the United Fruit Company grew to gigantic proportions; mining interests and banks moved in; and sugar plantations were concentrated under American Control" (p. 150). The U.S. military deployed to the region when its investments came under attack.

Specifically, a large insurrection began in Nicaragua in 1912, and at the request of the Nicaraguan President, the U.S. government tasked the Marines to take the lead in the local government. The longest of the Banana Wars, this conflict led to the Marines spending 20 years in the country. During this time, the Marine Corps began learning what worked when dealing with an insurrection in foreign countries. One important lesson was how to win the hearts of the locals. Smedley Butler arrived in Granada with rations, provided Red Cross supplies, and forced the surrender of the rebels; thereby, gaining the admiration of the locals. These lessons lead to the "gratitude of the inhabitants, who had been at the mercy of their vindictive enemies for several weeks, was unbound and freely and frankly expressed-especially by the women of that city" (Metcalf, 1939, p. 413). While Marines were in the countries, they would build roads and bridges while establishing health care and instituting schools. Law and order was preserved through active patrolling and with the aid of the locals. During this time, the Marine Corps learned some very valuable lessons on advising and detailed them in the manual *Small Wars Manual*. The manual states, "Gradually there must be instilled in the inhabitants' minds the leading ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and property, and individual liberty" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1990, p. 32). The *Small Wars Manual* was the Marine Corps' first attempt at capturing the lessons of state-building and counterinsurgency.

4.   Vietnam War

The U.S. Army and USMC had different views of how to fight the war in Vietnam. In his book, E. F. Murphy (1997) states that the Marines did not agree with General Westmoreland' and challenged his strategy (p. 38). The Marines believed that his strategy "was nothing more than a war of attrition" (p. 37). The Army had a "search and

destroy" methodology; thus, by attrition, they could deny territory to the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. The U.S. Army did not care about the villages because they were looking for a decisive engagement to defeat the enemy. The Marine Corps had "likened their strategy to a 'spreading ink blot,' and planned to work their way outward from their enclaves, enlarging the secure areas up and down the coast where the vast majority of South Vietnam's population lived" (p. 38).

The Marine Corps believed that pacification of the villages would work because of past experience. By necessity, a Marine battalion was running low on replacements while having its area of responsibility expanded (Moskin, 1992, p. 638). Therefore, to mitigate the shortage of Marines, "Combined Action Companies were created with a Marine squad and a Navy corpsman assigned to work with each Popular Force platoon. The first of these units was established at Phu Bai by 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines-partly as an expedient way to stretch the thinly spread battalion there" (p. 638).

This strategy was the beginning of the Marine Corps combined action platoon. They would live and patrol in the villages and gain the trust of the local villagers. The USMC did show some success, however; "Although General Westmorland acknowledged the benefits of the Combined Action Platoons, he did virtually nothing to encourage their use" (Murphy, 1997, p. 37). Thus, the strategy of big army looking for decisive engagements ruled the conflict.

5.   Post 9/11 Campaigns: Afghanistan and Iraqi Wars

Both campaigns enjoyed swift conventional victories, yet in both cases, the United States failed to understand effectively what happens after a conflict in a culture that does not have the same values and understanding of government systems. This lack of understanding has provided valuable lessons; thereby, "retaining, collecting, and analyzing current SFA efforts helps future Advise and Assist operations reduce the risk of repeating mistakes and improving the chance of success of future efforts across the globe" (Payne, Osberg, & Rand Corporation, 2013, p. 1). Coalition forces developed partnering and training tactics for both Afghan and Iraq forces to combat the insurgency with different measures of success.

U.S. military forces won the war quickly and decisively in both countries; however, they continued to look for conventional battles even after winning the war. U.S. military leaders continued to look for the large battles to gain momentum and crush the enemy, which is the right course of action when a military faces a formidable enemy of approximately the same size; however, it does not work against an insurgency. The military made considerable gains when partnered with the FSF. From conducting all missions to observing the FSF conduct the missions, "for the past 12 years, the United States and Coalition Forces have committed to developing the capacity of the Afghan security forces" (U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, 2014, p. 1). This process took time; at first, U.S. forces performed the missions and then explained how to execute the missions. Next, the U.S. military demonstrated the missions as the FSF observed. Then, the FSF imitated the U.S. military as they both accomplished the mission. Finally, the FSFs conducted the planning and execution of the missions as U.S. forces observed their actions. This process allowed the U.S. military to relearn and improve advising. Phases four and five, stabilizing and enable civil authority, are thus allowed to help complete the cycle to return to phase zero of operational planning, which is the desired steady state.

6. Conclusion

History shows that the blood and treasure of another country is the best way to fight battles. Sicilians dealt a heavy blow to the Athenians with the help of one advisor 2,500 years ago. As a result, Sicilians regained control of their island, and on a grander scale, the Spartans were able to win the war. It does not matter if you are Sicilian, American, South Vietnamese, or an Afghan or Iraqi; motivated people, who receive just a little help through advisors, are empowered to fight for themselves, which is especially true if they can find someone who actually believes in the justification of the fight. The United States has recently invested 14 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. During those combat years, many lessons have been learned, and in some cases, relearned. Advisors are the common denominator and a force multiplier. In these five examples of wars, the use of advisors has shown how people can be trained to win the battles, which ultimately, wins the war.

C.   MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMANDS

The Marine Corps has created and recreated ways to conduct manning and training for advisor teams. As a necessity, the Marine Corps created commands to provide specific training to exclusive teams to combat insurgency. The Marine Corps evolved the advisor-training units as the missions grew and lessons were learned. These sections explores the history of the different units used to man, train, and certify teams who deployed as advisor units that developed at the beginning of the Iraq and Afghan wars.

1.   Advisor Training and Certification Prior to the Insurgency in Iraq

History has shown that advising has been intertwined with the military and its execution in foreign countries. An example is Iraq, where no formal training unit was designated within the Marine Corps to conduct the training prior to the insurgency because prior to the insurgency, the host nation (HN) received little engagement training. Traditionally, Marine Corps infantry units focus most efforts on the warfighting functions. The functions serve as planning aids for the execution of operations. Marine Corps doctrinal publication (MCDP) 1-0 states, "by integrating the warfighting functions, the commander can increase the force's combat power, mass capabilities on the enemy, and aid in the assessment of the operation's success" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2011). Warfighting consists of six functions: command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. According to the MCDP, "the warfighting functions encompass all military activities performed in the battlespace" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2011). However, units have trained mainly to the six identified functions. Most unit training stops after you take the hill and consolidate and prepare for a counter attack.

According to MCDP 1-0, "the warfighting functions apply equally to conventional and other types of operations, such as information operations, counterinsurgency, or other forms of irregular warfare" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2011). However, nowhere in the six functions does it address engagement, foreign security forces, or security cooperation. The six functions demonstrate how to

execute the fight. Once the war is over, immediate withdrawal without a stable government in place could create a vacuum that undesirables attempt to fill. One item missing that could help execute the withdrawal is proper execution of the exit strategy in phases four and five. The local population needs structure and instruction to build itself back up. When America defeats the enemy, what is left is shattered pieces of society and the United States has historically taken the responsibility to return the country to a productive nation that is a responsible entity within the world economy.

2. Iraq and Afghanistan Advisor Training and Certification after the Insurgency in Iraq

Once the Marine Corps realized that America was fighting an insurgency, it determined that it needed specialized training to rout the insurgency and withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. This section follows the evolution of the Marine Corps training units.

a. Advisor Training Center

One of the first attempts to formalize training, in the general force, took place when the MEF in Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton created the ATCs. The Iraq era was the first time general forces were asked to advise on a large scale since Vietnam. ATCs were attached to each MEF Headquarters Group (MHG) and were the central location for training the different FSF advisor teams who would deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. MEF commanders wanted FSF advisor teams to be capable of assessing, training, and advising partnered nations (PN), while maximizing their own survivability. The envisioned end state is when PN forces are capable of continual operations without U.S. assistance.

The idea was that the ATC would become a "train the trainer" type of command: "The cell focuses on language and culture training, combat marksmanship, combat lifesaving, communications and Humvee training in addition to preparing the teams for partnering and mentoring missions in Afghanistan" (Burton, 2010, p. 1). Manpower requests for advisors were sent to the subordinate commands within the MEF, and once identified, they reported to MHG. In a Marine Corps news article, Cpl Burton (2010)

stated, "the ATC's mission is to form, equip, train, deploy and redeploy advisor teams to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom" (p. 1). All teams, regardless of task, were sent to the ATC to gain the necessary training. The end results were teams that could deploy into a country and train the PN or HN.

b.   *Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group*

Based in Fort Story, Virginia, the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) was created in 2007 to provide an "enduring institutional capacity that demonstrated the Marine Corps' commitment to global defense and security cooperation" (Marine Corps Training & Advisory Group [MCTAG], 2014). MCTAG was created to help combatant commanders build partner capacity through SFA missions.

According to the MCTAG command brief,

> MCTAG coordinates and oversees USMC SFA efforts, assists regional Marine Forces (MARFOR)s in identifying and sourcing Partner Nation training requirements, and enables USMC Operating Forces, Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), and Supporting Establishment Teams in executing SFA missions (MCTAG Command Brief). Additionally, the MCTAG command briefs desired endstate was that MCTAG provides a coordinated, synchronized approach to SFA resulting in the establishment of persistent, long-term relationships with Partner Nations and increases their capacity in consonance with theater security cooperation and engagement plans. (MCTAG, 2014)

However, the title MCTAG was not enduring after all. While the group was deactivated in 2011, its mission would expand and merge with the ATG to become what it is today.

c.   *Advisor Training Group*

The ATG was established at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, in 2008 to certify training teams prior to deploying into theater. The certification phase of training was known as Block IV training and ensured that all FSF advisor teams, prior to deployment, had full immersion scenario exercises to evaluate the training teams' theater-specific protected mission. This training included role players who served as partner-force soldiers and leaders, as well as key civilian

personalities, such as tribal chiefs, to assess each team's ability to address various scenarios. At the end of a 30-day assessment, teams were certified ready to deploy if they met the threshold of the training requirements. In 2014, on order of Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), the ATG was deactivated.

d. MCSCG

The MCSCG, located in Fort Story, Virginia, was established in 2011 as the result of a consolidation of MCTAG and Marine Corps Security Cooperation Education Training Center (MCSCETC). The MCSCG's mission is a combination of the MCTAG, ATG, ATC and SCETC. The MCSCG's missions is to

> coordinate, manage, execute, and evaluate U.S. Marine Corps security cooperation programs and activities to include assessments, planning, related education and training, and advisor support to ensure unity of effort in building partner security forces capacity and capability in order to facilitate USMC and regional Marine Forces component command security cooperation objectives. (MCTAG, 2014)

The MCSCG is now the "Marine Corps primary SC organization for non-policy issues" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2014a, p. 5–2). Its duties include proposing SC education, managing quotas for the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM), training advisors, reviewing and managing SC training standards, certifying Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)/SC teams, conducting capabilities-based assessments, validating global force management and foreign military financing program requirements, providing planning and execution support to the MARFORs and MAGTFs, providing in-country coordination and liaison support, executing the education and training programs for international students, supporting the development and reviewing all SC related documents, and maintaining a SC information repository. The MCSCG's coordination, liaison, assessment, and training teams (CLATT) develop 3–5 year FSF-specific plans and work with tasked MEF units to operationalize those training plans. The MCSCG also regularly sends staff members with FSF advisor teams to ensure that the training group has complete situational awareness of current issues.

3. Conclusion

Before the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps did not conduct specialized training for Marines going to participate in advising. Since its initial startup, the ATC at I MEF is now the Advisor Training Branch under G-7 and ATC at II MEF is completely stood down. The ATG and MCTAG are no longer in existence and their mission has been assumed by the MCSCG. The MCSCG in Fort Story, Virginia has incorporated all roles into its security cooperation mission. By having one unit, the training better prepares the teams to meet the goal of "develop[ing] innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities" (Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3). Advisor training is an absolute necessity for the Marine Corps' future; hence, the MCSCG is vital to the continued success of the Marine Corps as a viable global force.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Advising is a complicated process that has impacted major events throughout written history. This chapter provides a small sample of five events and the impact those events had on advising through engagement. Marine Corps leaders realized that they needed to incorporate the lessons learned from history and teach fundamental skills to those who would be executing counterinsurgency operations. More specifically, after over a decade of combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military recognizes that valuable lessons must be captured. Consequently, the second half of this chapter focuses on the development of the Marine Corps training units since the start of the insurgency during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. These conflicts resulted in the emergence of the MCSCG, which trains teams to address the complete spectrum of SC.

However, once fighting is complete, the real diplomacy begins. No nation can lose a war and then stand up a functional government without help. If the U.S. government wins, it is obligated to help a new government emerge from the ashes. Without this help, a vacuum is left that encourages others to seize power for themselves, which allows for more problems in the future.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

> Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truth—America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all people. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead.
>
> —President Barack Obama

In the new 2015 NSS, President Obama lays out his vision regarding the important issues facing America and his priorities to deal with them. As the quote outlines, leadership is essential to accomplish this mission; however, it is not the only essential factor for a successful strategy. This chapter covers two sections. The first section analyzes national level documentation, for example, the new 2015 NSS, and how it shapes advising. The second section examines previous studies and their findings on the different elements of advising. The constraints imposed by national level documentation, as well as the recommendations suggested by previous studies, collectively offer criteria that can be used to assess the current advising process.

A. NATIONAL DIRECTIVES

Recent U.S. national strategy and policy directives place new constraints for commands to follow. These directives, provided by elected civilian leaders, govern the U.S. military in the form of strategy, directives, and guidance. The end result is the direction needed to achieve success in the national security strategy. Leaders in the DOD interpret these documents through many lenses to strengthen the U.S. military. For example, one area of focus is SC. National guidance speaks to the need to conduct SC, and the benefits it creates, such as preventing conflict, deterring aggression, reassuring allies/partners, deepening relationships/trust, increasing responsiveness, burden sharing, maximizing effects and minimizing costs, mobilizing collective action, BPC, specializing capabilities, reducing U.S. casualties, interoperability, assuring access, increasing permissive environments, increasing professionalism, and minimizing miscalculation to

name a few (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013, p. 14). In the case of SC, national documentation provides direction for advisors on how to engage foreign militaries.

A flow diagram illustrates the linkage between all the documents the military uses at the strategic and operational levels to achieve a comprehensive strategy for a specific country as shown in Figure 1. The documents that support national strategies and policies based on law and world events are shown in column 1. National level guidance and direction that these devices should follow are shown in column 2. Many of these documents are classified, which causes the content to be beyond the scope of this research. The regional/service level guidance is divided into service and combatant command categories as shown in column three. The service category has maritime and Marine Corps directives that give the individual services detailed direction on how to organize, man, train, and equip their forces to achieve the objectives laid out in the NSS, Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), and National Military Strategy (NMS) among others. Global Force Management sources the manpower that the combatant commanders employ, as directed by the Guidance for Employing the Force (GEF). These orders are classified and are beyond the scope of this research. However, it is important to understand how they work together to achieve country development; the end product is a country level strategy that shapes the militaries' responsibilities to ensure that SC is achieved.

Figure 1.   Cooperation Documentation Flow Diagram

1.   National Strategies, Policies, and Guidance

National strategies and policies demonstrate the linkage of how laws and acts combine with world events and other strategies to shape country-level guidance. This section examines the national security strategies and polices, along with directives from the DOD's national level guidance. Together, these directives provide the foundation for training, planning, and manning teams to execute a specific country-level guidance plan to support America's national level objectives.

a.   2015 National Security Strategy

If the collection of national security directives is the foundation of SC, then the *2015 National Security Strategy* is the cornerstone that all other documents support. This document expresses America's long-term national security interests and how to address them for the foreseeable future.

More than the *2010 NSS*, the *2015 NSS* demands that U.S. agencies work with capable partners. The President states that working with partners is essential for international engagement, "These partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international behavior" (White House, 2015, p. 3). By supporting other countries to defend themselves, America can then refocus its resources to address other challenges. The President continues to say, "Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to work with other countries to counter the ideology and root cause of violent extremism will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield" (p. ii). This executive guidance orders the military to train foreign countries to stand up and fight with America. Battlefields are evolving, and America must help shape this evolution by preparing countries to engage.

Essentially, the U.S. military must provide the training to build the capabilities of its allies. If America wants to battle extremists, it is necessary to act "decisively to defeat direct threats, we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict to include countering extreme and dangerous ideologies" (White House. 2015, p. 7). The new *NSS* clearly indicates that working in coalitions is the future of modern warfare. America does not engage threats on its own; it needs to provide training to allies, so they can stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. military. After this training is complete, U.S. allies look to America to provide additional leadership.

To achieve these desired results, the military must provide the right manning, in the right place, and at the right time. President Obama highlights the significance of America's leaders in the *2015 NSS*, which emphasizes that the appropriate individuals must be selected to further America's interests. The president states that this nation is

"leading international coalitions to confront the acute challenges posed by aggression, terrorism and disease" (White House, 2015, p. i). SC through engagement is a large piece in the military's future, and therefore, America's military leaders must have the expertise, knowledge, and social skills to interact with other communities worldwide. In other words, U.S. military leadership should be a source of inspiration on the global stage.

b. 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance

To strengthen relationships with foreign nations, the Secretary of Defense advocates for strong training to build allied forces. Consequently, both the Secretary of Defense and the President offer input on the *2012 DSG*, which provides guidance and sets priorities for the DOD. The *2012 DSG* is linked to the *2010 NSS*; however, it is not in direct alignment with the new *2015 NSS* because that document was released after the *2012 DSG*. The *2012 DSG* defines 10 primary missions to the U.S. Armed Forces, and six of these directly relate to SC training.

Listed first is the mission of counterterrorism (CT). The *2012 DSG* advocates putting continuous pressure on al-Qaeda and enlisting FSF to help accomplish this mission by preparing such forces to fight the CT battle (White House, 2012, p. 4). Along the same lines, the *2012 DSG* lists deterring and defeating aggression as second. SC provides access into other countries where relationships can be built; this initial entrance into a nation is critical to BPC, which in turn, allows for a unified effort against aggression. Additionally, the third mission directs the United States to project power in a display of sound deterrence that would inhibit enemies from succeeding in their objectives (p. 5). By gaining direct entry to the objective area through its partnerships, the U.S. military has more mission execution freedom. For instance, the U.S. military needs access to locations like the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) and the sea port of debarkation (SPOD), and permission to perform overflight and refueling in these areas; however, the United States might not need these. After all, it is what the USMC's forcible entry can provide if needed.

The eighth primary mission directs the military to provide a stabilizing presence to "conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational

deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises" (White House, 2012, p. 5). This presence allows U.S. forces to build partner capacity and reinforce deterrence as a stabilizing force that reassures this nation's allies. Subsequently, the *2012 DSG* lists conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations as ninth. A military-to-military engagement builds stability, and thereby, reduces insurgency and the demand for U.S. forces (p. 6). Advising allows shared experiences, through engagement, that sanctions a united effort to combat insurgency. Finally, the tenth mission focuses on U.S. forces providing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other operations, when tragedy strikes worldwide. Accessibility and partnership allows effective and efficient execution during the response to allies and PNs. Together, they provide logistics, response, information sharing, specialized capabilities, funding, resources, and assets in a timely manner to help those in need.

Based on this document, coherent and well-trained teams are essential to meet these directives. After a decade of war, the Secretary of Defense articulated a need to recalibrate the military and make additional investments to win future conflicts. One way to succeed is to train more teams to meet the challenges of SC. By continuing the training and advising mission, U.S. forces help allied and partnered militaries to succeed.

c.   *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*

Programs provided through SA, like the military-to-military exercises, produce "a regionally focused force to provide additional tailored packages that achieve critical global and regional objectives, including in critical areas, such as the Asia-Pacific region" (Secretary of Defense, 2014, p. 23). The Secretary of Defense signs the congressionally mandated *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) every four years, which validates the DSG. Like the *2012 DSG*, the *2014 QDR* directs the military to adapt from the decade-long war and look to the future. The QDR also looks to reshape and rebalance the military to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

In his assessment of the *2014 QDR*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides a prioritized list of defense missions. The ninth of twelve priorities is to conduct military engagements and security cooperation. The *2014 QDR* also provides a list of

three risks that might inhibit the ability to achieve the priorities. The second risk listed is that it is essential to rely on allies and partners. The U.S. military accepts risk when relying upon PNs for collective action; therefore, it is in America's best interest to provide training to those nations to mitigate and reduce that risk.

The world has globalized and no country can stand against the challenges alone. The *2014 QDR* states that "maintaining U.S. global posture and presence to support stability, security, and prosperity will become more challenging" (Secretary of Defense, 2014, p. 34). The best way to face those challenges and to build global security is through engagement and SC. The United States stands together with its partners and allies to face the common threats during globalization.

d.   2011 National Military Strategy

The adaptive military leadership faces new challenges in a time of austerity. The *2011 NMS* provides the "ways and means" for the military to further America's national interests while counting on fewer resources. The *2011 NMS* validated the *2010 NSS* and *QDR* reports with an emphasis on four national military objectives: counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, and shape the future force.

Manning and training plays a central role when two of the four national military objectives are directly related to security cooperation. To counter the violent extremists, the report states, "we will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, p. 6). According to this strategy, advising teams must consist of individuals who can cooperate with foreign militaries to achieve the international community's goal of enhanced security. The report also speaks about the need to strengthen international and regional security. America must collaborate with other nations to "preserve forward presence and access to the commons, bases, ports, and airfields commensurate with safeguarding our economic and security interests worldwide" (p. 10). Advisers must be trained in a wide array of skills and acquire the adaptability to operate in an ever-evolving environment. American

interests are best secured when the United States provides the best training by the best-manned military.

e. Conclusion

A review of the national strategies/policies with a focus on SC indicates training and manning are important to gaining access, nurturing partnerships, and building partner capacity. These documents provide the necessary direction to create a SC vision. The new *2015 NSS*, along with the *2012 DSG*, and *2014 QDR*, directs the military to build capable coalition partners able to stand with America in the battles of the future. The updated *2015 NSS* gives fresh guidance from the President and the National Security Council's perspective and focuses the U.S. military training. When looking through the lens of SC, a review of the *2011 NMS* emphasizes both manning and training during this time of austerity. Even though the updated *2015 NSS* was just released, the older directives are cyclical and still in effect for utilization in planning. Understanding the effects of national strategies and policies on how the U.S. military is to organize, man, train, and equip allows this thesis to direct the focus on training, doctrine, and manning.

2. Regional/Service Level Guidance

While the previous section examines the national level, this section assesses regional and service level guidance. Regional and service level guidance covers two components. Regional guidance provides the combatant commanders with the theater strategy and theater campaign plans, which are classified and beyond the scope of this research. Service guidance is also divided into two sections, maritime and Marine Corps. While the Marine Corps is a part of the Navy, the maritime function is beyond the scope of this research. Expeditionary and planning guidance is the focus of this research and addresses specifically training, doctrine, and manning. Expeditionary Force-21 and the Commandants Guidance are updated directives that generate detailed focus for the Marine Corps.

a. Expeditionary Force-21

The Expeditionary Force-21 (EF-21) is the Marine Corps' vision of how the Marine Corps will organize, man, train, and equip to accomplish its future objectives. EF-21 is an update to the Marine Corps *Vision and Strategy 2025.* EF-21 establishes focus areas, one of which is conducting SC. The Marine Corps plans to provide training teams, task forces, and Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) that have received proper training for the area to which they are assigned. The Marine Corps understands that "building partner capacity often results in more responsible, competent security forces, able to resolve a local crisis before it becomes a threat to U.S. interests and requires intervention" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2014b, p. 30). Therefore, engagement is the best tool to use to ensure that security is achieved. EF-21 states that SC is a key contribution to meeting the geographic combatant commander's requirements when assisting a PN. A major accomplishment is achieved when a PN can act and resolve issues before the U.S. military must become involved.

b. 36th Commandant's Planning Guidance 2015

The Commandant's planning guidance (CPG) updates guidance on how the Marine Corps sets the conditions to fight and win against future enemies" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2015, p. 2). In a budget-constrained environment, the Marine Corps has to streamline manning to meet this nation's challenges. The CPG outlines the new Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) priorities for his coming tenure.

The CPG speaks to the degraded unit cohesion and manpower practices that have created significant gaps in leadership. The CMC conducted an "overhaul of our manpower management and readiness reporting models, systems, policies, and processes [that] will allow the Marine Corps to minimize personnel turbulence, increase unit stability, and develop cohesion" (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2015, p. 7). Manpower is key to the CMC because he wants to ensure that this country is combat ready. The CMC also feels that certain capabilities need "immediate attention." Building partner capacity is the first he lists. CPG identifies BPC as an, "increasingly important

component of the Nation Defense Strategy" (p. 11). Partnered security cannot be achieved without the right manning available to accomplish the requirement.

3. Conclusion

Marine Corps guidance is an interpretation of the national strategies/policies, national level guidance, and service level guidance that provides direction to organize, man, train, and equip the force, including preparing for advisory missions. A simplified visual representation of the linkages of all the documentation to achieve SC is shown in Figure 1. Currently, three of the documents are less than a year old. Therefore, the concept is young and the results will cause many changes in the coming years. What is apparent is that these directives provide guidance to the U.S. military to work with other countries in achieving peace. While the United States is prepared to act unilaterally if it must, however, the military needs to prepare to take the lead to build partner capacity.

B. RELATED STUDIES

Where strategic guidance, orders, and directives, an agenda of training, doctrine, and manning provide a framework to develop the FSF advisor team capabilities, the following related studies represent a sample of research that supports the specific training, doctrine, and manning requirements for the FSF advisor team competencies. These related studies offer evidence on the impact of training, doctrine, and manning on engagement while providing the necessary background information, current regulations, and practices.

1. Training

With enough training, most people can learn to do almost anything. Advisor training is the fundamental tool that prepares Marines to work with foreign militaries. Marines must receive training certification to train foreign militaries. First, train to know the job, and learn how to transfer the knowledge to others. When working with FSF, transferring knowledge also includes working through numerous issues to include language barriers, cross cultural communication context, foreign disclosure challenges, dissimilar

equipment issues, cultural differences, specialized roles in the security effort, and different infrastructure baseline (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013, p. 47).

Training is essential to achieving America's desired security goals. Pirone (2010) conducts an in-depth study regarding SFA. He states, "it is becoming increasingly important for the U.S. to assist its allies in developing the capability to be responsible for their own actions" (p. 1). He examines U.S. assistance to El Salvador from 1980–1992, and the U.S. assistance to the Philippines from 2002–present, and compares them to U.S. security force assistance to Afghanistan.

One point that Pirone helped to clarify was the difference between FID and SFA. Joint Publication 1-02 defines FID as, "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security" (Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 326). SOF is usually assigned the FID mission because FID is internally focused. Joint Publication 1-02 defines SFA as, "The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions" (p. 145). SFA traditionally was a SOF mission, but due to the excessive numbers of personnel required to conduct SFA, many general purpose forces are now training to conduct the SFA mission, while SOF remains the lead.

Pirone's recommendations clearly defined goals and objectives through training to develop PN security capabilities. Once a clear goal and objective is defined, then a unity of effort needs to happen. Everyone must work together to achieve the goal. He argued that to achieve these goals, the most important factor is the selection and qualification of the advisor. "The individual advisor, having the most direct contact with partner nation personnel and units, is perhaps the most important factor in any U.S. assistance effort" (Pirone, 2010, p. 75). PN interaction is critical to the success of the goals and advisors are in constant and direct contact.

2. Doctrine

Marine Corps commanders train their troops vigorously based on the doctrine they have at their disposal. Warfighting functions provide standard operating procedures (SOP) for commanders to train to a common core.

a. *Advisor 2.0: Advancing the Military Transition Team Model by Jones*

Military doctrine is the basis for all training conducted by the U.S. military. Major Jones' study (2008), *Advisor 2.0: Advancing the Military Transition Team Model*, examined the battalion level advisor teams, and how their organization, training, and education identify that teams are insufficient to meet operational requirements. These battalion teams are a subset of the old USMC MTT. He argues that the USMC identifies MTTs months in advance of deploying while some battalion FSF advisor teams are not identified until they are in country. The battalion teams train according to the warfighting functions of maneuver, logistics, and force protection, however, and not on advising or engagement. Once in country, the battalion teams are unprepared to train and advise foreign units.

Major Jones concludes, "in the current counterinsurgency fight, or future full-scale conventional operations, the USMC MTT requires effective organization, education, and training" (Jones, 2008, p. ii). Battalion teams must be identified early and organized prior to deployment and allowed to train as a team for the mission. If a team has, "the proper organization, and solid academics, the training schedule balanced between combat skills and advising theory will produce the most effective USMC MTT" (p. 13). If the teams train only to the six warfighting functions, the teams have a majority of the combat training required. Commanders must educate their Marines on engagement; however, no Marine Corps training manual on engagement operations exists.

b. *Afghanistan 2012 and Beyond: Clearing, Holding, and Building with Transition Teams by Tryon*

Having a doctrine is not good enough; it must be followed to achieve uniformity for all Marines. Major Tryon's (2012) study stated, "political and military leadership [need to] to follow doctrine and allow Military Transition Teams to finish the COIN

campaign" (p. i). He outlines that *Field Manual (FM 3-24) Counterinsurgency* is the right manual to transition governance and security to the Afghan people (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014a). When Major Tyron wrote his thesis, the United States operated for two years after establishing a self-imposed exit date for all U.S. forces to redeploy. Major Tyron also used arguments from high-ranking political figures who claimed that counterinsurgency (COIN) was not working. He claimed that COIN was a difficult and timely undertaking and that everyone must work together to route the insurgency.

Major Tyron feels the United States has a good doctrine but is executing it poorly. Tyron (2012) states, "the current COIN strategy has three problems: lack of Afghan support, failure of the U.S. to follow its own doctrine, and degrading support for the war itself" (p. 10). He added that four problems prevented training teams from being effective: ineffectiveness of personnel selection, fatigue, misuse by ground commanders, and a training curriculum not designed for an illiterate soldier.

Major Tyron concluded (2012) that the United States must reduce the large military footprint and focus on the MiTT, which allows for the transition in Afghanistan. "Military Transition Teams with the proper structure of personnel, operating at the battalion level and above with a focus on technical skills and building a professional army, are the best hope for a smooth transition" (p. 20). He claims that FM 3-24, if followed, provides the right course of action to win. The key to success is the HN, and with MiTT assistance, they must fight the battles.

3. Manning

The studies in this section identify the need to improve manning advisor teams. These documents have identified shortfalls related to the Marine Corps selection of Marines to fill billets on advisor teams. Developing the right manpower through HRDP is essential for the successful deployment of advisor teams. Marines need the appropriate rank, MOS proficiency, age, gender, maturity/patience, availability, specific experience, instructor background, temperament, language skills, and regional expertise, along with many other qualifications to succeed as an advisor.

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a.   *Personnel Sourcing for Transition Teams by Saunders*

The Marine Corps is manning teams in several different ways. Most teams are staffed internal to units that have received tasking for SC related missions. For other tasks, Marines are stripped from existing units, and are unprepared and inexperienced to execute the defense strategy. Saunders (2008) writes about personnel sourcing for transition teams and how the Marine Corps sources manpower for transition teams. After introducing the transition team basics she states, "there is no standing Marine unit that supplies personnel to all transition teams so personnel must be sourced from existing Marine units" (p. 3). She spoke about how the transition teams were the main effort in 2008. She also discusses how the Marine Corps takes majors from critical billets within a combat arms battalion. A major fills one of two billets, an executive or operations officer. Both are critical to the battalion and cause the battalion commanders to fill the vacancies with junior company grade officers. Saunders (2008) explains how the Marine Corps takes Marines from different units to form teams and usually they are, "unprepared, unwillingly, and with insufficient time to train properly before deployment" (p. 6). The FSF advisor teams have, and hold, a vital mission for years to come. For this reason, manning is crucial to the success of the mission.

Saunders (2008) concluded that the exit strategy for Iraq was the proper transfer of security from the coalition forces to the Iraqi security forces. She stated that everyone, from the President to the battalion commanders, supported this exit strategy. However, the Marine Corps selected its teams based on "availability vice qualifications" (p. 8). The Marine Corps is not organized with dedicated advisor units from which to pull. The Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA) and Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments (MMEA) divisions do not assign Marines to advisor units; they are usually sourced via IA process. The usual tools and mechanics to assign Marines are methodical and institutional, and are slow to change. She identified that embedding with foreign military was a demanding task, which required a well-manned and trained unit that could work together as a team. The training at the time did not meet the mission.

b.   *Selection of Military Advisors by Clark*

Not everyone is suited to interact with foreign militaries; therefore, the selection of individual team members for FSF advisor teams is directly related to advising success. Clark (2007) conducted a thorough study on manning transition teams. His focus and analysis was on Army teams for Iraq. He argued that the selection of advisory personnel is critical for successful advising. His historical background is a review from the time of T. L. Lawrence to Vietnam era. Due to the harsh environment of living, working, and fighting with PN, he argues that some service members are "better suited than others to such austere and often ambiguous environments" (p. v). He believed that the Army should develop selection criteria for the U.S. military personnel to achieve prior to becoming a team member. Once selected, the Army can assess the individuals through the training and team formation to determine their match for the team.

Clark (2007) concluded that "the lost lessons of Vietnam seem particularly haunting in light of the mission in Iraq" (p. 67). Thirty years of lessons have been "forgotten in the files of history" (p. 67). It seems as if the military is trying to regain its proficiency. He also argued that selected U.S. personnel need better training, because without training, military forces are ineffective. The results indicate that screening and selecting of the best people to man the training team produce a higher level of success. While "selection, preparation, and employment" (p. 68) is important, collecting the positive and negative feedback is just as important. The data must continue to be collected to ensure the future success of the teams.

c.   *Conclusion*

These studies on advising, speak directly to training, doctrine, and manning. The common theme of these studies identified a need for specific skill sets to achieve success on a FSF advisor team. All the studies revealed that training was very important and quality team training was needed prior to deployment to allow for the maximum utilization during the deployment. Some of the studies focused on military doctrine. Whether doctrine existed and was not used, or something is being missed, doctrine is essential to keep everyone operating on the same page. Manpower is the number one

contributing factor to the overall success of a team, whether its selection criteria, qualifications, or personnel, they have to be able to operate in small teams. Regardless of the personnel selected without the proper doctrine or training, the team never reaches the mission objectives.

C.   CHAPTER SUMMARY

Together, the national strategies and policies and related studies provide a deeper understanding of how engagement through advising builds partner capacity. A national directive review is not enough to understand engagement; previous studies provide scholars' views on engagement and suggest how to achieve America's national interests. These directives and studies established the framework of training, doctrine, and manning, which are used to conduct a fluid analysis.

IV. ANALYSIS

> An advisor is an implanter of information and ideas. All other considerations must be subordinated to this purpose. An advisor is a mature, dedicated individual who exercises patience and perseverance in accomplishing his mission. An advisor is an individual who does not attempt to Americanize everyone he meets; rather he helps people make of themselves what they want, not what the advisor wants.
>
> —Major Irving C. Huldin

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have greatly increased the need for the U.S. military to employ small teams to conduct security force assistance missions. These operations are not only restricted to combat zones. Regional theater security cooperation plans have evolved requiring an increase of FSF teams to support the building of partner capacity, security, and stability in identified countries. This chapter analyzes the current training, doctrine, and manning practices used by the Marine Corps and provides ideas to improve the Marine Corps' security force assistance training and doctrine in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan era.

A. FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TEAM TRAINING

The MCSCG currently provides training and support to Marine Corps missions. One of MCSCG's missions is to provide advisor training to Marines deploying to conduct security force assistance. Appendix B presents a description of the MCSCG established BAC consisting of 39 classes ranging from introduction to advising through to a scenario-based assessment of advising skills. The BAC is designed to provide students with the basic knowledge needed to be successful during an advising tour. The course is a three-week evolution, which awards the 0570 MOS for officers and 0571 for enlisted Marines. According to Marine Corps Order 1200.17E, the *Military Occupational Specialties Manual*, a free MOS is not a primary MOS that any Marine can obtain and is not related to their primary MOS (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2013, p. x). The course is held at the MCSCG facilities in Fort Story, Virginia. Additionally, MTTs can provide limited elements of the BAC to commands that will fund the training.

MCSCG is currently redesigning the advisor courses. The redesigned training aims to implement new education and standardize the FSF advisor teams. Additionally, the goal is to ensure that pre-deployment training supports the myriad of security force assistance missions that may develop. The new advisor training objective is to help advisor teams to problem solve creatively in a variety of ambiguous environments. A combination of prescriptive training and developmental education should serve as the core of the BAC permitting "shared understanding, and spread [the] best practices throughout a counterinsurgency community" for either civilian, military, and non-government personnel (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 7). An example of the new training is learning to assess the literacy of a partner force. If the force cannot read, then the program of instruction will need to be significantly adjusted. In Afghanistan, the overall literacy rate for males aged 15 and older is 43.1 percent, while the female rate is 12.6 percent (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015, p. 3). These rates pose a challenge for FSF teams that plan to share written documents to support mission execution when only 43 percent of the partner force can read. Therefore, it is a truism that "inbound Brigade Combat Teams and Division Headquarters should understand the operational environment and prepare now for combined team embedded partnership operations" (Grigsby Jr. & Pendall, 2010, p. 10). Developing an understanding of the operational environment starts with the pre-deployment training and the follow-on assessment for the FSF mission. In this case, just testing the literacy of the partner force may help shape the teaching techniques the team can use to achieve the training objectives, and in turn, allow the follow-on team to continue to improve on the previous team's efforts.

In an article for the *Small Wars Journal*, Colonel Grigsby and Lieutenant Colonel Pendall (2010) stated, "pre-deployment combat training centers in the U.S. and NATO Sponsored mission preparatory exercises are well-suited to provide context and current operational frameworks to refine processes and procedures for integrating staffs with combined team approaches toward the mission" (p. 10). The difference between training and educating is that training is for the known environment and educating is for the unknown environment. For example, training is conducted for conventional warfare fought on a field with fixed rules and objectives. The tactics change, but the environment

remains the same and is known. Conversely, education is employed for asymmetric warfare, which has no rules, no court, no uniform, and no prescribed tools and is unknown. Marines need to be taught what has worked in the past and should not have to relearn this information while conducting the mission.

To conduct the required training, the Marine Corps must invest manpower hours and resource material to train Marines in advising operations. The total manpower cost for the MCSCG to hold one BAC is $117,755.35. Annually, for 10 BAC courses, the Marine Corps will incur a manpower cost of $1,177,553.50, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2.   Annual BAC Costs

BAC Costs

Cost of 18 persons to deliver 10
three-week Basic Advisor course

Instructors per delivery	18
course deliveries per FY	10
Students per class	25
Cost per Marine	$4,710.21
FY15 MPMC Composite Rate	$117,755.35
Annual cost	$1,177,553.48

Calculations for the three–week course were derived from the DOD regular military compensation (RMC) calculator ("Regular Military Compensation Calculator," 2015), as shown in Appendix D, which provides an annual salary. The annual salary was then converted to an average monthly pay of the ranks in the MCSCG training instructor group (TIG). The MCSCG T/O lists 24 Marines in the TIG. Five Marines can be removed to account for leadership and administration, which leaves 18 Marines to instruct the BAC course. Not calculated is the time necessary for the Marines to become proficient in instructing the course. The average monthly pay—to include base pay, basic

allowance for subsistence (BAS), basic allowance for housing (BAH) located in the continental United States (CONUS), and tax advantage of all the ranks in the TIG—is shown in Appendix D and consolidated in Table 2. The T/O indicates that four sergeants, six staff sergeants, six gunnery sergeants, and two majors make up the training instructor cadre and cost $83,824.46 to provide one, three-week BAC. Together, with the $33,930.89 in administrative costs, the total cost to provide one BAC is $117,755.35. According to the establishment of a MCSCG message dated October 4, 2011, the average class size was approximately 25 students, which resulted in a cost of $4,710.21 per student over the three-week period.

Table 2.   Manpower Cost Breakdown for One Course

Pay Grade	Monthly Pay	Weekly Pay	3-week Course Pay	18 Marine Training Team Cost	TIG Administrative Cost
E5	$4,570.44	$1,142.61	$3,427.83	$13,711.32	$6,855.66
E6	$5,731.60	$1,432.90	$4,298.70	$25,792.20	
E7	$6,470.34	$1,617.59	$4,852.76	$29,116.53	
E8	$7,126.21	$1,781.55	$5,344.66		$10,689.32
O4	$10,136.27	$2,534.07	$7,602.20	$15,204.41	$7,602.20
O5	$11,711.62	$2,927.91	$8,783.72		$8,783.72
			Total	$83,824.46	$33,930.89

Total course cost	$117,755.35

The BAC is one small element of the TIG, which is a section under MCSCG. Another section within MCSCG has six regional sections called CLATT that work with geographic combatant commanders (GCC), component commanders for the Marine Forces (MARFOR), and HN to develop security cooperation engagement plans (SCEPs). Each regionally aligned MARFOR develops and implements a SCEP in support of its respective GCC. SCEPs are typically three- to five-year plans designed to prioritize SC efforts to meet theater objectives, such as building partner capacity, enhancing

interoperability, assuring access, and maintaining military-to-military relationships. In turn, these objectives are then translated into actionable training packages executed by appropriately tasked MEFs, allowing the FSF advisor teams to know what has been done prior to their arrival and to shape future efforts. A graphical representation of how FSF advisor teams work together to achieve success is shown in Figure 3, which is read counterclockwise from the top. As the teams deploy, each partner force is assessed counter clockwise from red to yellow and becomes green once it has achieved mastery of the objectives.

Figure 3.   Security Cooperation Engagement Plan Cycle

Due to the SCEP, FSF advisor teams are able to develop a better understanding of long-term objectives and how the team's efforts, in the short term, will fit into the larger security cooperation plan for a given region or country. The SCEP also allows the FSF

advisor teams to support the partner forces continuously to become mission capable. Important to this effort is an assessment of the desired security role for the partner force, as each situation will require a tailored training package. In some cases, the FSF may not need to conduct combat operations, and therefore, the training effort may be less resource intensive. If the country-specific program requires multiple deployment iterations, then assessment from rotation to rotation is vital to ensure steady progress. Otherwise, teams do not know what was done in the past as "few military units we encountered had any visibility on events in their battlespace more than 18 months in the past" (Barno, 2011, p. 7). Before the SCEP was implemented, no continuity existed between FSF teams across rotations. In some cases, this challenge led to FSF advisor teams determining what to train their partner forces on after arrival in country. Originating with a request for forces (RFF) from MARFORCOM, parent commands form FSF advisor teams to conduct specified missions in support of the GCC's TSCP. Since SCEPs are an independent effort to shape SC efforts in a country, the regionally-aligned CLATT works with the newly assigned FSF advisor team to create a training plan tailored to fit the team's needs to achieve success. Additionally, the team leader reviews the records of the new team to determine deficiencies in the Marine annual training and calculates what is required to meet the Marine Corps pre-deployment training program (PTP), which includes a series of classes, ranges, and drills that each GCC requires prior to anyone arriving in theater. A sample timeline of what the FSF advisor teams may need to accomplish for training prior to deployment is shown in Figure 4. In support of the actual FSF mission, most teams must conduct an initial, mid, and final planning conference (FPC) (initial planning conference (IPC), mid planning conference (MPC), and FPC). Depending on the length of the deployment, the team must also consider pre-deployment leave, additional language training, foreign weapons, advanced driving, or high-risk concealed carry training. Regardless of the requirement, the training must be completed prior to the mission rehearsal exercise (MRX), which allows for a complete evaluation of the team prior to deploying.

Figure 4.   Sample FSF Advisor Team Training Plan

Thirty-nine classes on advising are offered during the BAC; however, eight classes are also tied to annual training requirements and could be taught through the parent command. The S-2 Intelligence section could teach classes on the controlled release of information, the law of war and the rules of engagement, legal considerations in an SC environment, counter elicitation, and surveillance awareness. The S-3 operations section could teach limited instructional delivery methods and range operations. Together, these classes account for 24 hours or three days of training, which helps to reduce the overall course length. It is assumed that each unit can provide a standardized period of instruction and thus, incorporates lessons learned and a consistent level of instruction that the MCSCG is providing. Additionally, parent unit training also maintains the expectation of performance between the FSF advisor teams and the home station organization.

The BAC provides a foundation for every advising action that a team member is likely to implement while deployed and in a forum that allows the team to receive all the

required classes at one time. This tactic prevents the material from being diluted across the pre-deployment schedule, which could cause further gaps and conflicts in training. Additionally, once a class is completed, students are asked to fill out an instructional rating form provided in Appendix C. These forms are filled out to be used by the instructors to improve their delivery and the class itself. Upon completion of the BAC, students fill out an end of course critique provided in Appendix F. This form affords students the opportunity to submit an assessment of the course as a whole to help the unit improve.

To cultivate the process of BAC feedback, MCSCG could formally use the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to support gathering and cataloging not only BAC feedback, but more importantly, post-deployment FSF team AARs. This support would improve the continuity of lessons learned between FSF advisor teams serving in the same location.

Beyond the BAC, typical FSF advisor team training models are cluttered with additional training requirements that may not be appropriate for all deployments. For example, Figure 4 emphasizes blocks of instruction on foreign weapons, advanced driving, and High Risk (HR) concealed carry. What if a specific mission does not require training on foreign weapons or if force protection firearms are not authorize in the HN? These scenarios would drastically change the pre-deployment training for a given FSF advisor team. Once teams are identified for a specific mission, the train-up model should be tailored accordingly to ensure that the limited training time available is not squandered on erroneous events.

Additionally, Figure 4 illustrates a gross shortcoming in FSF advisor team preparation. The schedule of events does not account for actual mission preparation. This sample assumes the FSF advisor team is already competent on all the skills it will impart on a foreign military in a foreign language. For those who have conducted training missions as short as a few weeks, program of instruction (POI) preparation is essential to ensure the actual mission of the FSF advisor team is successful. Such preparations include POI development, translation of the POI, collection of key materials, such as

teaching aids, and of course, detailed rehearsals of the various classes. Most FSF teams have captured these experiences in AARs upon returning from deployment.

The MCCLL was established to become a repository for all AARs. This organization has helped deploying units gather insight on the challenges previous units faced while deployed. Every AAR collects best tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and specific items of interest for the deployed unit and is stored for future use. It does not provide for a statistical analysis of the course to determine which classes add value prior to deployment. Only a survey designed to collect general information and specific numerical ratings on each class determines if that class is statistically significant.

The current course provided by the MCSCG encourages informal reach-back, but it does not offer Marines a formal or systematic option for providing feedback after they have deployed. The MCSCG is receptive and interested in informal reach-back and follow-up. The classroom offers students the theoretical concepts that have been developed, molded, and formed from past experiences. The deployment provides the students the ability to implement those concepts by applying them in the daily performance of their duty. These concepts are modified, reshaped, and tested to provide an improved product that works during deployment. Taking ideas from concepts in the classroom and developing them into general guidelines, Marines have a unique opportunity to provide criticism to field-tested concepts, which offers insight into the ever-evolving battlefield.

The Marine Corps' manual discusses how to develop classes from idea to delivery but has no system in place to incorporate AARs or lessons learned. The systems approach to train (SAT) manual dated June 2004 provides the MCSCG both the instructional rating form (Appendix C) and end of course critique form (Appendix E) to evaluate instruction. The purpose of this manual is to help develop, analyze, and improve teaching. While the manual does a great job detailing what is needed to conduct the teaching, it does not include a process to evaluate AAR and lessons learned to improve on the training. As is, no mechanism is available to determine the impact of the basic advisor course classes once a unit comes back from its mission.

B. FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TEAM DOCTRINE

The Marine Corps has a comprehensive doctrinal system established for warfighting functions. Currently, the Marine Corps has 10 MCDP to address the major warfighting activities. According to Marine Corps Bulletin 5600 dated December 8, 2010, Marine Corps service doctrine consists of publications created to describe the warfighting TTP of the Marine Corps located in Table 3. This doctrine details the fundamental principles that guide Marine Corps forces to perform assigned missions. The MCDP provides commanders the tools necessary to conduct planning and operations. However, none of the publications equip commanders with the knowledge to conduct security force assistance missions.

Table 3.   List of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications

MCDP 1	WARFIGHTING
MCDP 1-0	MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS
MCDP 1-1	STRATEGY
MCDP 1-2	CAMPAIGNING
MCDP 1-3	TACTICS
MCDP 2	INTELLIGENCE
MCDP 3	EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS
MCDP 4	LOGISTICS
MCDP 5	PLANNING
MCDP 6	COMMAND AND CONTROL

Incoming Marine Corps FSF advisor teams are forced to adjust to different requirements as the new team arrives into a deployment with limited knowledge of what current teams are currently executing. SC is a long process that takes time and will span numerous teams. FSF teams must know where they are in the SCEP, which will determine the team's training priorities. Therefore, new teams not only need to know what the previous team has done, they must know what all the teams before them have accomplished. With no doctrine, FSF teams are placed in a situation in which "we continually forget, relearn, discard our corporate knowledge" (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 1). Without doctrine, FSF teams that have completed their deployment and conduct turnover with a new FSF team may have a different focus, which reduces the previous team's

accomplishments. Outgoing teams face frustration as they "spend 12 months rolling the boulder up the hill only to see it roll back to the bottom when they go home" (Barno, 2011, p. 7). A common endstate must exist that every FSF team understands, as well as where they fit in to accomplish that endstate.

Commanders typically initiate Marine Corps training as a result of assigned missions they receive through external orders and directives. The MCDP doctrinal series covers the requirements for MAGTFs to conduct tactical level operations. However, the FSF advisor teams spend a majority of their time while deployed in mentoring and advising roles in conjunction with tactical operations. Therefore, the current MCDP series experiences two main shortfalls. First, no doctrinal foundation for the Marine Corps is available to follow to integrate security force assistance under the guidelines of MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. The MCDP 1-0 discusses the six phases of military operations, which include shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. Phase 0 is to shape, which builds friendly relationships. Phase 1 is to deter without force to pursue U.S. interests. Phase 2 is to seize the initiative with the start of combat power. Phase 3 is to dominate the enemy by destroying them. Phase 4 is to stabilize and initiates the beginning of reconstruction. Phase 5 enables the local civil authority to assume control as the legitimate governing body. MCDP 1-0 does discuss limited terms of SC, SA, and sustainment operations, however, not once does it provide guidance to commanders on how to conduct mentoring and advising.

Secondly, it is unclear if the tasks and standards codified in the MCDP series are appropriate to actually developing foreign security forces. Aside from training a partner force on specified skills, the standards and expectation of the training are also important considerations. How can Marine FSF teams train and develop partner forces to a realistic standard if the doctrinal foundation is not scalable for security forces in developing states to actually build and sustain identified capabilities? Simply, if the Marine Corps is serious about developing a FSF training capability, realistic doctrine that covers training and operational standards is needed.

When Marines go to the field, it is common practice to conduct offensive and defensive drills. A platoon conducts a raid through another platoon's lines and then

consolidates and prepares for the counter attack. The point is that units typically stop to conduct an after-action of the effectiveness of the attack and defense. The crux of the problem is that the training has always stopped short of completing the cycle of the six phases of military operations.

The Marine Corps trains continually up to phase three but fails to take the time to even discuss or train the final two phases of the operation. Little time is allocated to build engagement skills with the collapsed country, which is in need of help to rebuild what was destroyed. Marines train to fight; however, they do not receive the education to engage, repair, and rebuild. The Marine Corps' six warfighting functions provide strategic level doctrine on what is required; however, it falls short on teaching the necessities to return a country to an actively producing member of the world community.

The Marine Corps' lack of doctrine also creates confusion in conducting the FSF training mission. Teams must have a source document that establishes objectives that allow them to train as a team to an understood standard of performance and then be able to operate in a manner that will in turn fulfill the expectations of the command that assigned the mission. Additionally, an effective security force assistance doctrine will also aid in linking the efforts of successive Marine FSF team rotations conducting the same mission.

Although the Marine Corps currently lacks any institutionalized doctrine on this niche subject, U.S. military resources do exist on which the Marine Corps could build. The U.S. Army identified a similar shortfall and created a functional concept to address engagement. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has created a TRADOC pamphlet (TP) 525-8-5. The pamphlet, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, could help address the Marine Corps' lack of a capstone doctrine that addresses all the concepts and address the non-coercive elements of applying military power. Coupled with this document, the Army also has the *FM 3-07-1: Security Force Assistance*, which serves as a practical team-level doctrinal resource for all elements of executing security force assistance. As an interactive resource, the J7-Joint Force Development of the Joint Staff has also established the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth, KS to serve as a the Center of Excellence

for Security Force Assistance. The purpose is to directly support warfighting, doctrine development, and operating force requirements and to address SFA challenges through analysis and research (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2015, p. 1).

With these resources, Marine Corps commanders have the ability to include security force assistance and general engagement training into their annual training plans. Institutionally, the Marine Corps at large can build on these resources to train on what capabilities and skills are needed to support foreign security force partners. Without a doctrinal foundation, deploying units will not have the ability to develop and later access lessons learned. Furthermore, an institutionalized doctrine will enable the Marine Corps to prepare capabilities and skills and forecast the time needed to develop well-prepared FSF advisor teams.

C. FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TEAM MANNING

Once standards for doctrine and training are established, it is essential to select the most capable Marines to execute security force assistance missions. No doubt exists that "each player must understand the others' strength, weakness, capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks)" (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 4). Advising is a fluid and ever-changing process because the enemies are evolving their TTP to counter America's transformations. Teams must be developed with the mission in mind to achieve the desired end state. Teams are small and have limited manpower resources; therefore, teams must have members with diverse backgrounds and not individuals who are masters in a specific area. Time must be spent selecting the right individuals that fit each the team.

The Marine Corps has many capable Marines, but not everyone is suited for advising. Therefore, the Marine Corps must find the right people who can execute difficult tasks in difficult environments. Advisors must be great communicators, have patience and maturity, and have the ability to negotiate, all the while advising in a non-judgmental way. Advisors should have a basic understanding of the language and culture. If they have experience in the region, an understanding of SA, and a high level of MOS

proficiency, then they possess the unique qualities for joining a team. Advisors have to perform in the absence of direct supervision and must have the ability "to rapidly develop and learn new techniques and apply them in a fast-moving, high-threat environment, bringing them to bear before the enemy can evolve in response, and rapidly changing them as the environment shifts" (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 2). Simply, Marines need to be able to think on their feet in a fast-changing environment.

The Marine Corps not only needs to find capable Marines, but it must also find leaders who can provide mentorship to other Marines, as well as to the foreign military leaders. In his congressional testimony, LtGen(Ret.) Barno (2011) stated that American leadership needs to be reasserted and that "success [requires] 'Leadership plus Strategy plus Resources'" (p. 1). Marine advisors need to be very competent at many skills to teach FSF through an interpreter. Advisors must inspire FSF leaders to lead from the front to help establish them as credible leaders ready to fight for their own interests.

For the last decade, the Marine Corps has sacrificed the readiness of its unit to deploy FSF advisor teams. The GCC understand that they must organize "major parts of the remaining U.S. force more clearly toward the 'Advise and Assist' mission sooner, not later" (Barno, 2011, p. 4). Currently, the GCC requires that teams engage with countries in their area of responsibility (AOR). This requirement is sent to the Joint Staff for action, and eventually, to the services to be sourced. U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM) is responsible for sourcing the requirement. One method used to source FSF advisor teams is to use the IA program. The team members are taken individually from the operating and supporting establishment. This method ignores unit cohesion and focuses only on filling the individual team member requirement. This technique forces individuals to come together as teams and foster esprit de corps with limited time and little recourse if individuals do not fit into the team.

Individually augmenting is a process the Marine Corps uses to fill individuals versus unit manpower requirements. The requirements may necessitate a Marine with a special skill or capability, usually in a specific rank. The Joint Manning Document (JMD) is made up of lines of requests; usually, an individual fills a line number known as a requirement tracking number (RTN). Within the line is the information describing the

task the Marine will be assigned. Some of the included information is rank, MOS, job description, duration, and location. The manpower requirements tracking module monitors the sourcing for the JMD. This module fills the request using limited factors and does not account for the specific job and team dynamics.

The IA requirement filters down to the battalions and commanders, who are forced to task people without a complete understanding of the team's needs. While Marines are filling the IA, they are accounted for on their parent unit command, yet the commander of the parent unit cannot request another person to backfill the billet. For example, a battalion is tasked with filling the team leader billet, usually an O-4 major. In most cases, a battalion only has two or three majors, an executive officer, operations officer, and sometimes, the commanding officer of a weapons company. Therefore, the parent unit's on-hand strength is depleted by 33–50 percent for that unit, which creates large gaps in the commands without the ability to backfill. One possible remedy could be to assign an inbound O-4 who is between tours to fill the requirement.

D.   CHAPTER SUMMARY

Warfare has evolved since the first battle between men. Today, small teams conducting security force assistance can be the vehicle that allows nations to remain peaceful and helps limit escalation to full-scale warfare. History has shown that once the fighting is done, power vacuums will develop if the victor remains inactive. Time must be invested into the people of the fallen nation to allow them to stand up and become productive members of their society. Building partner capacity, security, and stability is in the best interest of every nation. The key is providing FSF teams with the training, doctrine, and manning practices that encourage them to take the necessary time to achieve the desired endstate once the battle is over.

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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

This study analyzes the Marine Corps training, doctrine, and manning for FSF advisor teams. A multitude of laws, acts, and national strategies cumulatively explain the origins of the requirements for FSF advisor teams. The HRDP is how the Marine Corps identifies requirements and funds, accesses, and develops the free MOS assigned at the completion of training by the MCSCG. HRDP supports the FSF advisor team in delivering the right person with the right skills, in the right place, at the right time, to achieve the desired deployment readiness outcome.

This FSF advisor team mission is essential to the execution of the U.S.' national and military strategies, and time must be spent providing comprehensive training. This training is among the most important tasks assigned to the Marine Corps today. MCSCG indicated that the training requires a minimum of 17 instructors to accommodate one BAC. The instructor cost for one three-week BAC, consisting of 39 advising classes, is approximately $118,000. While all the instructors are not needed at every class, some classes, such as the practical application classes, need more instructors to facilitate the training. SC is not a trait that comes naturally to an individual; therefore, an investment in training will exponentially increase the probability of mission success.

Once pre-deployment and BAC training is complete, the FSF teams are expected to perform the mission of advising through engagement. However, the Marine Corps lacks specific doctrine in a uniform document that explains how to integrate SC. This void will likely reduce the impact of any training program due to the lack of resident knowledge regarding SC.

The final key to the triad is the proper manning of the FSF teams. SC requires cohesive teams able to work through many challenges associated with advising. Cohesion is a term used to explain how well a group of individuals come together as a team. However, the manner by which FSF requirements were filled in the past came with a significant cost to the parent unit's personnel inventory. Moreover, the current training

pipeline lacks sufficient time to create FSF team cohesion among the newly formed teams. Therefore, the following conclusions and recommendations are provided in support of improving the training, doctrine, and manning essential to successful deployment execution.

A.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After conducting an analysis of historical and current practices, this thesis provides the following answers to the questions outlined in Chapter I.

1.   Primary Question

Based on historical Marine Corps engagements and partnerships, what fundamental skills should be taught in the Basic Marine Advisor Course?

a.   Conclusion

SC training directly supports the goals of America's security strategy. An analysis of the literature suggests that conducting SC classes more frequently provides for better unit cohesion because personnel are assigned from various units using a variety of standards. In addition, individual units lack access to the MCSCG's lessons learned and AARs to update training on a regular basis. To estimate the impact of each class within the BAC, specific data must be collected to form a relationship between a class and the mission. When MCSCG has well-defined goals and objectives that the rest of the Marine Corps understands, training can help develop PN, while meeting America's national security objectives. Currently, MCSCG lacks data, and the collection of the right data could determine if classes should remain in the curriculum. While the course objectives have been written and rewritten from lessons learned post-deployment, an instrument, such as a survey, has never been used in conjunction with the BAC classes. That data would provide direct input from returning teams on what classes to delete, expand, or maintain.

b. Recommendations

The MCSCG should implement the post-deployment survey developed by this research. The sample survey provided in Appendix F could serve as a strawman. This survey has not been beta tested or submitted through an Institutional Review Board (IRB) process. The survey draws a comparison between general class information and team member shortfalls. An analysis of the survey data will yield the required information to determine the value of each class to the training teams.

2. Secondary Question 1

What Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication Is Needed to Assure Continued Success with Engagement?

a. Conclusions

The research could not find any Marine Corps order (MCO) or directive that instructs commanders on how to train Marines for engagement operations. The Marine Corps doctrinal publications cover combat operations, but nothing could be found that addresses TTPs for engagement or the six phases of military operations. Military engagement can begin anywhere within the six phases and sometimes happens concurrently. The Marine Corps has mastered phases two (seize the initiative) and three (dominate) during training; however, when a unit goes to the field to conduct field exercises, training stops once a unit assaults through the objective. This stoppage is problematic because once your assault ends and the unit consolidates, which ends phase three, two more phases need to be conducted. Phases four (stabilize) and five (enable civil authority) are not perfected during training, yet they are vital to conduct turnover with the local authorities and to end America's role in the conflict. Returning the countries involved to phase zero (shaping) will help rebuild relationships.

b. Recommendations

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) should create a Marine Corps doctrinal publication for engagement. Currently, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has created a TRADOC pamphlet (TP) 525-8-5. The

pamphlet, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, could provide the Marine Corps with the necessary framework to create such a directive. The new Marine Corps directive would also allow commanders to include engagement in an annual training plan for all Marines and to institutionalize training on what capabilities and skills are needed to support HN, regional partners, and indigenous peoples.

3. Secondary Question 2

How Should Marines be assigned to Foreign Security Force Teams?

a. *Conclusions*

The current process of manning FSF advisor teams through IA may have a detrimental effect on the parent unit. While an IA responds to a priority-tasking requirement on a FSF advisor team, that individual's parent unit is left with a limited number of personnel by rank and MOS. Moreover, when units are tasked with sending a key billet holder on an IA, it may adversely affect the unit's cohesion, which is a well-established component of readiness. In addition, unit cohesion for a newly formed FSF team is not immediate. This cohesion takes time. While the parent unit's cohesion is torn apart, the new FSF team is thrown together, and if insufficient time is given prior to deployment, then the FSF advisor team's readiness is affected.

b. *Recommendations*

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps should follow suit with the Navy's NAVADMIN 147/07, which establishes a procedure for filling teams through the equivalent of a Marine Corps monitor. The methodology used by the Navy through the NAVADMIN, Global War on Terror Support Assignment (GSA), the Marine Corps will contribute to improved readiness through unit cohesion and work-life balance. Monitors fill FSF advisor team requirements on a scheduled rotation instead of short notice, mid-tour, temporary duty, or IA. Scheduled rotation supports the monitor's ability to improve stability at the unit level. Given that staffing is a zero sum game, vacancies will still exist; however, this process better supports today's work-life balance in the all-volunteer force.

B. FURTHER RESEARCH

Follow-up research should examine what is required for training second or third iteration advisors. Tests should be conducted to survey the level of proficiency for teams on their second or third tours of advising. Teams could be split into groups of individuals who have or have not attended supplemental training to determine if full, supplemental, or no training is required prior to additional deployments.

Additionally, once enough survey data is gathered, the MCSCG could request another thesis student to analyze this data. A minimum of 30 teams would need to complete the training and survey to provide a large enough sample for a valid survey. The results should be a detailed analysis of teams' input on the appropriateness of the classroom instruction. First, develop and Beta test a survey to be used to evaluate pre-deployment training. Second, collect survey data for X respondents over Y period of time to gain a better understanding of what is necessary during pre-deployment training for FSF advisor teams. These two examples of follow-on research will provide the MCSCG with enough data to decide what to keep, delete, or rework to provide the most complete program to Marines executing an SC mission.

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APPENDIX A. QUESTION BANK DURING INTERVIEWS

"*Composition, training, and management of Foreign Security Force (FSF) Advisor Groups*"

Question Bank

Manning
Who develops the mission?
Who can requests a team?
Who tasks-out manning?
What is the driving factor for manning numbers?
How long does it take from the time of the request, to having boots on the ground?
How are personnel selected for the team?
What phase in a person's career path or current tour are they selected? Before PCS? After PCS? After being at a command for 1 or 2 years?
What MOSs would make up an ideal team?
What MOS should be a team leader?
What MOS should be an operations officer?
What billets are needed to make a team? How does this differ from MOS?
What is an ideal team size?
Should there be personnel dedicated to security and if so how many?
Who, what MOS, should make up a police mentor team?
Who, what MOS, should make up a boarder mentor team?
Who, what MOS, should make up an army mentor team?
Who should select the team?
Should the team be built from different units or from the same unit?
Who funds the personnel assigned to FSF?
What precedence level does FSF receive? i.e., exempt, operational, priority, pro-share

Training
How long is the first time advisor training?
How long is the previous advisor training?
Are advisors assigned and MOS? ADMOS?
What weight does that MOS carry?
Who certifies the training?
How long is a certification valid?
Do historical training and after action files exist?
What is the structure of the current training program?
What level or amount of language proficiency is incorporated into the training? Defense language aptitude battery (DLAB)?
How much culture is incorporated into the training?
How much combat arms is incorporated into the training?
What tactics are to be taught to foreign forces?

Is there a national training guideline?
Who sets the requirements for the teams?
What training must an advisor complete prior to checking in to the deploying unit?
Who funds the collective training?
Is the training specific to a country or is it generalized?
How much first aid is taught?
Is there any training that cannot be completed at the training facility and must be contracted out?
What training is missing?
What training was most important?
What training was least important?
Historically, what have the mentors found most important and least important in the training and what after action did the teams feel should be incorporated from experiences on the ground?

Equipment
Who supplies the equipment?
Who provides maintenance on the equipment?
What training is not provided prior to departure and must be completed once the team arrives at their destination?
What equipment is missing?

General
What is the future of Foreign Security Force Advisors?
Is there a plan to use them in other countries? If so, which countries?
What is missing that this program needs the most?
IS the mission of these teams to train or advise?

APPENDIX B. MCSCG BASIC ADVISOR COURSE CLASSES

- **Operational Culture** *1 hour class*—Expose students to the five dimensions of operational culture in order to assist with mission planning. This class gives a familiarization in applying Operation Culture when dealing with an FSF with respect to SC.

- **Building Relationships and Rapport** *2 hour class*—Learn the importance of establishing rapport with Foreign Security Force counterparts as a fundamental action of advising foreign counterparts to achieved desired U.S. endstates. This class explains how to establish a relationship with a FSF.

- **Cross-Culture Communications** *2 hour class*—Learn the difference between communication styles across the globe. Direct v. indirect; collective v. individualist, high v. low context, etc. Learn the importance of non-verbal communication. This class will show cultural differences, and communications verbally and non-verbally.

- **Recognize Cultural Stress** *1 hour class*—Learn the phases of cultural stress and the interrelationship with operational stress. Means to mitigate cultural stress are discussed. Recognizing stressors in a physical and metaphysical environment, and ways to mitigate stressors.

- **Social Perspective Taking** *2 hour class*—Gain an understanding of how a foreign counterpart's perspectives influence his behavior. Learn a method to develop approaches to influence foreign counterparts. This class explains how to get past cultural nuances when dealing with an FSF.

- **Control Release of Info** *1 hour class*—A review of Operational Security (OPSEC) considerations within the context of a SC mission in a foreign country. Familiarizes the student on the procedures of releasing information to an FSF.

- **Communicate Through an Interpreter** *1 hour class*—Instructs the student how to plan and prepare to employ interpreters effectively when speaking to an FSF

- **Interacting with Media** *1 hour class*—Familiarizes students on how to employ PAO, develop proactive media posture, and respond to media inquiries.

- **Law of War & ROE in an SC Environment** *3 hour class*—Familiarizes students on the Laws of War and ROEs the team may face.,

- **Legal Considerations in an SC Environment** *3 hour class*—Defines the legal aspects and their implications while supporting an SC event.

- **Human Rights Awareness** *1 hour class*—This class gives the basics information of Human Rights violations and what to look out for while in country.

- **Analyze & Design a Security Cooperation Training Plan** *5 hour class*—This class gives a familiarization in Sourcing Documents and Training Plan Development.

- **Instructional Delivery Methods** *8 hour class*—Review and practical application of common instructional techniques that typically worked best with FSF in resource-limited operating environments. This class gives familiarization in lecture and non-lecture based instruction.

- **Develop a Security Cooperation Letter of Instruction** *3 hour class*—Application of the third phase of the Systems Approach to Training Process to planning detailed training for FSF. Instructs how to develop an LOI based off the SCO's guidance

- **Train the Foreign Security Force** *2 hour class*—Taught only to team leadership and staff. Student's learn how to use the Marine Corps Systems Approach to Training Process to analyze higher guidance from national and campaign level planning documents to determine training objectives for the FSF they are assigned to train and advise. With this guidance, students learn to design effective and realistic training plans to achieve US objectives for the desired FSF security role. Focuses on the conduct and the evaluation phases of the SAT process and interaction with the FSF.

- **Range Operations** *2 hour class*—RSO and Range Set up procedures

- **Range Operations** *1 hour class*—Practical Application of terrain mitigation and SDZ restrictions.

- **Range Operations** *1 hour class*—Reinforcement of range operations fundamentals, processes, and procedures and their application to the design and implementation of live fire ranges in a foreign operating environment. Performance Evaluation of terrain mitigation and SDZ restrictions.

- **Counter Elicitation** *1 hour class*—Method used to recognize and mitigate elicitation in a foreign country.

- **Surveillance Awareness** *3 h hour class*—Provides an overview of types of surveillance, indicators of surveillance, and how to drive a FP route, and reporting suspicious activity.

- **Surveillance Awareness (PA)** *8 hour class*—Familiarization with terrorist planning cycle and procedures to mitigate vulnerability of SC teams operating independently in foreign environments. This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

- **Apprehension Avoidance** *1 hour class*—Review of fundamental martial arts techniques useful for SC team members to disengage from hostile encounters with foreigners while operating independently in a foreign country. Focus is on personnel keeping team integrity (especially while on liberty in small groups) and extricating themselves from undesirable situations. Provides methodology on how to gain SA and mitigate threats.

- **Apprehension Avoidance (PA)** *6 hour class*—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

- **SERE B (+)** *3 hour class*—Provides an overview of types of isolation, and how to mitigate interrogation.

- **SERE B (+) (PA)** *3 hour class*—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

- **(S) SERE 250** *4 hour class*—Classified. This class instructs the students to defeat personal restraints.

- **(S) SERE 250 (PA)** *4 hour class*—Classified. This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

- **Emergency Action Planning** *2 hour class*—Review of common components of Emergency Action Plans needed by SC teams operating independently in foreign countries. Heavy focus placed on procedures for recovery of missing personnel. Provides overview on how to plan on overseas contingencies based on DOS and DOD guidance.

- **Team Level Operations Center** *1 hour class*—**Team Level Operations Center (PA)** *.5 hour class* - This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

Additional Courses that can be added to the Basic Advisor Course
- **High Risk Concealed Carry Course** *32 hour class*—Provides overview on defensive mindset, concepts of concealed carry, and advanced pistol marksmanship.

- **HRCC Brief** 1 *hour class*—This brief will teach the students the terms, different carries, and familiarizations they will utilize within the HRCC course.

- **Combat Lifesaver** *12 hour class*—This class gives the basics of medical treatment; Airways, Breathing, and Circulatory.

- **Regional/Country Medical Threat Brief (LP)** *1 hour class*—This class will inform the student about medical threats that are common in their geographical AOR.

- **Assess Geographic Medical Requirements** *1 hour class*—Geographical specifics as to medical threats and requirements found in their geographical AOR.

- **Advanced Tactical Driving (Contracted)** *24 hour class*—This will familiarize students with the fundamentals of defensive driving.

- **Language** *40 hour class*—This class, taught by CAOCL, teaches the students region specific language skills.

- **Foreign Weapons** *Tailored*—Familiarization with a variety of foreign weapons systems. Focus is on nomenclature, assembly and disassembly, maintenance, and battle sight zero (BZO) procedures. The foreign weapons classes will be different per the area the SC Team will be going to. MCSCG currently has (19) foreign weapon systems to teach from.

APPENDIX C. INSTRUCTIONAL RATING FORM

INSTRUCTIONAL RATING FORM

One way instruction is improved is by sampling student reaction to the instruction. To assist in improving this lesson, please answer the following questions. This will assist the school in improving our courses.

Instructor:		Date:

Course:	Lesson:

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the answer that indicates your level of agreement or disagreement as follows: **Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Agree=3, and Strongly Agree=4.** Please explain in the section labeled comments any ratings of 1 or 2. If the question is not applicable, then circle **NA**.

1. INSTRUCTOR	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	NA
a. The instructor showed a thorough knowledge of the lesson material.	1	2	3	4	NA
b. The instructor communicated the lesson material in a way that could be easily understood.	1	2	3	4	NA
c. The instructor gave precise instructions concerning in-class exercises.	1	2	3	4	NA
d. The instructor encouraged student participation.	1	2	3	4	NA
e. Student's questions were answered in a professional (not demeaning to the student) manner.	1	2	3	4	NA
2. LESSON CONTENT					
a. The content was presented at the right pace.	1	2	3	4	NA
b. The student outline aided my understanding of the content covered.	1	2	3	4	NA
c. The environment of the class was interactive.	1	2	3	4	NA
3. SAFETY					
a. Lesson related safety to job performance.	1	2	3	4	NA
b. Cease Training procedures were adequately explained.	1	2	3	4	NA
c. Safety precautions were reemphasized prior to commencing tasks.	1	2	3	4	NA
d. Safety was paramount at all times.	1	2	3	4	NA
e. Equipment/material was safe for use.	1	2	3	4	NA
4. METHODS/MEDIA:					
a. The in-class exercises required in the course were worthwhile learning experiences.	1	2	3	4	NA
b. The way that the class material was presented enhanced my ability to learn/perform the concept/task. I especially liked the _____ method.	1	2	3	4	NA
c. The media complimented instruction.	1	2	3	4	NA
5. STUDENT: Circle the answer that best describes your knowledge level.					
a. My knowledge of the content prior to this class was	None	Very Little	Average	Above Average	Expert
b. My knowledge of the content after completing the class was	None	Very Little	Average	Above Average	Expert

Name_____ **Parent Unit:** _____

Overall Comments/Suggestions for the Class (use back of form if more space is needed):

_____

_____

_____

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APPENDIX D. 2015 RMC CALCULATOR

RMC Calculator

Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator

Grade	E-5
Years of Service	6
Tax Filing Status	Single
Family Size, Including Yourself	1
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH	○ Yes ● No
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459

Calculate RMC

Note: Final display of your results may take a few moments while the browser processes your selected tax data. Results will appear below when complete.

Grade	E-5
Years of Service	6
Tax Filing Status	Single
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH?	false
Living OCONUS?	N/A
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459
Annual Basic Pay	$32,814.00
Annual Basic Allowance for Housing	$14,436.00
Annual Basic Allowance for Subsistence	$4,290.60
Non-Taxable Allowances (BAH + BAS)	$18,726.60
Number of Exemptions for Previous Calendar Year	1
Personal Exemption Amount	$3,950.00
Standard Deduction	$6,200.00
Total Deductions	$10,150.00
Taxable Income (Annual Basic Pay - Total Deductions)	$22,664.00
Tax Rate	15%
Gross Up	$22,031.29
Tax Advantage	$3,304.69

Total Regular Military Compensation (RMC): $54,845.29

RMC Calculator

Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator

Grade	E-6 ⌄
Years of Service	8 ⌄
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly ⌄
Family Size, Including Yourself	2
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH	○ Yes ● No
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459

[Calculate RMC]

Note: Final display of your results may take a few moments while the browser processes your selected tax data. Results will appear below when complete.

Grade	E-6
Years of Service	8
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH?	false
Living OCONUS?	N/A
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459
Annual Basic Pay	$38,743.20
Annual Basic Allowance for Housing	$21,240.00
Annual Basic Allowance for Subsistence	$4,290.60
Non-Taxable Allowances (BAH + BAS)	$25,530.60
Number of Exemptions for Previous Calendar Year	2
Personal Exemption Amount	$7,900.00
Standard Deduction	$12,400.00
Total Deductions	$20,300.00
Taxable Income (Annual Basic Pay - Total Deductions)	$18,443.20
Tax Rate	15%
Gross Up	$30,036.00
Tax Advantage	$4,505.40

Total Regular Military Compensation (RMC): $68,779.20

RMC Calculator

Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator

Grade	E-7
Years of Service	12
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly
Family Size, Including Yourself	2
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH	○ Yes ◉ No
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459

Calculate RMC

Note: Final display of your results may take a few moments while the browser processes your selected tax data. Results will appear below when complete.

Grade	E-7
Years of Service	12
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH?	false
Living OCONUS?	N/A
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459
Annual Basic Pay	$46,972.80
Annual Basic Allowance for Housing	$21,780.00
Annual Basic Allowance for Subsistence	$4,290.60
Non-Taxable Allowances (BAH + BAS)	$26,070.60
Number of Exemptions for Previous Calendar Year	2
Personal Exemption Amount	$7,900.00
Standard Deduction	$12,400.00
Total Deductions	$20,300.00
Taxable Income (Annual Basic Pay - Total Deductions)	$26,672.80
Tax Rate	15%
Gross Up	$30,671.29
Tax Advantage	$4,600.69

Total Regular Military Compensation (RMC): $77,644.09

RMC Calculator

Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator

Grade	E-8
Years of Service	16
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly
Family Size, Including Yourself	2
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH	○ Yes ● No
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459

[Calculate RMC]

Note: Final display of your results may take a few moments while the browser processes your selected tax data. Results will appear below when complete.

Grade	E-8
Years of Service	16
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH?	false
Living OCONUS?	N/A
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459
Annual Basic Pay	$54,165.60
Annual Basic Allowance for Housing	$22,356.00
Annual Basic Allowance for Subsistence	$4,290.60
Non-Taxable Allowances (BAH + BAS)	$26,646.60
Number of Exemptions for Previous Calendar Year	2
Personal Exemption Amount	$7,900.00
Standard Deduction	$12,400.00
Total Deductions	$20,300.00
Taxable Income (Annual Basic Pay - Total Deductions)	$33,865.60
Tax Rate	15%
Gross Up	$31,348.94
Tax Advantage	$4,702.34

Total Regular Military Compensation (RMC): $85,514.54

RMC Calculator

Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator

Grade   O-4

Years of Service   16

Tax Filing Status   Married Filing Jointly

Family Size, Including Yourself   2

Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH   ○ Yes ● No

ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence   23459

[Calculate RMC]

Note: Final display of your results may take a few moments while the browser processes your selected tax data. Results will appear below when complete.

Grade	O-4
Years of Service	16
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH?	false
Living OCONUS?	N/A
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459
Annual Basic Pay	$87,368.40
Annual Basic Allowance for Housing	$26,172.00
Annual Basic Allowance for Subsistence	$2,954.88
Non-Taxable Allowances (BAH + BAS)	$29,126.88
Number of Exemptions for Previous Calendar Year	2
Personal Exemption Amount	$7,900.00
Standard Deduction	$12,400.00
Total Deductions	$20,300.00
Taxable Income (Annual Basic Pay - Total Deductions)	$67,068.40
Tax Rate	15%
Gross Up	$34,266.92
Tax Advantage	$5,140.04

Total Regular Military Compensation (RMC): $121,635.32

RMC Calculator

Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator

Grade	O-5 ⌄
Years of Service	18 ⌄
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly ⌄
Family Size, Including Yourself	2
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH	○ Yes ● No
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459

Calculate RMC

Note: Final display of your results may take a few moments while the browser processes your selected tax data. Results will appear below when complete.

Grade	O-5
Years of Service	18
Tax Filing Status	Married Filing Jointly
Living OCONUS or Not Receiving BAH?	false
Living OCONUS?	N/A
ZIP Code for Primary/Dependent Residence	23459
Annual Basic Pay	$98,391.60
Annual Basic Allowance for Housing	$28,656.00
Annual Basic Allowance for Subsistence	$2,954.88
Non-Taxable Allowances (BAH + BAS)	$31,610.88
Number of Exemptions for Previous Calendar Year	2
Personal Exemption Amount	$7,900.00
Standard Deduction	$12,400.00
Total Deductions	$20,300.00
Taxable Income (Annual Basic Pay - Total Deductions)	$78,091.60
Tax Rate	25%
Gross Up	$42,147.84
Tax Advantage	$10,536.96

Total Regular Military Compensation (RMC): $140,539.44

APPENDIX E. END OF COURSE CRITIQUE

END OF COURSE CRITIQUE

The End of Course Critique provides the school with your reaction to the course you just completed. The information you provide us is treated confidentially and is used to improve the quality of instruction for the overall course. Thank you for your input.

COURSE: **DATE:**

STUDENT NAME:

A. Circle or highlight the rating that indicates your level of agreement or disagreement. Please comment on all ratings of 1 or 2. All comments are encouraged regardless of whether you agreed or disagreed.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Disagree or Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	
1. I had a clear understanding of what I would be required to learn or do in this course? (The learning objectives were clearly stated.) COMMENTS:	1	2	3	4	5	
2. I am confident that I have learned or can perform the tasks required by the learning objectives? COMMENTS:	1	2	3	4	5	
3. The written and performance exams tested my knowledge and/or ability to perform the learning objectives? COMMENTS:	1	2	3	4	5	
4. The quizzes/puzzles/games/review sessions, when used, increased my knowledge of the subject and prepared me for the tests. COMMENTS:	1	2	3	4	5	N/A
5. Class time was used to achieve the learning objectives. COMMENTS:	1	2	3	4	5	
6. The time allotted to cover each lesson was appropriate for what I was expected to learn. COMMENTS:	1	2	3	4	5	

7. Course length was appropriate for what was expected. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5				
8. The overall schedule for the course flowed logically and was well-organized. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5				
9. Student outlines, training aids (i.e. internet sites, graphs, charts, maps), and/or references were available. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5 N/A				
10. The student outlines, training aids (i.e. internet sites, graphs, charts, maps), and/or references used supported instruction. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5 N/A				
11. Student outlines aided my understanding of the material. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5 N/A				
12. Student outlines were easy to follow. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5 N/A				
13. The media (i.e. PowerPoint, models, posters) used supported instruction. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5 N/A				
14. Considering the amount of material covered during the course, there was sufficient time available on both in-class and out-of-class (if applicable) work. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5				
15. The methods (i.e. lecture, demonstration, practical application, case study, group exercises) used to present course information helped me to understand the course material. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5				
16. Instructors were knowledgeable and well-prepared. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5				
17. The instructors responded effectively to questions and input. **COMMENTS:**	1 2 3 4 5 N/A				

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18. The instructors were professional. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	
19. The overall course gave me a thorough understanding of my duties in the operating forces and sufficient knowledge and skills to perform those duties. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	N/A
20. Instructors followed safety precautions at all times. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	N/A
21. Lessons on safety were included as applicable. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	N/A
22. Lessons related safety to job performance as applicable. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	N/A
23. Cease Training procedures were adequately explained as applicable. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	N/A
24. Emergency action procedures were adequately explained as applicable. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	N/A
25. Safety precautions were put in place prior to each event as applicable. **COMMENTS:**	1	2	3	4	5	N/A

B. Answer the following questions.

26. Were there any particular lessons/blocks of instruction that were particularly confusing or could be improved? YES/NO -- If you responded yes, please explain.

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27. Were there any portions of the course where there was idle time (i.e. standing around, not focused)? YES/NO -- If you responded yes, please explain.

28. What is your overall evaluation of the instructors?

29. What is your overall evaluation of the course?

APPENDIX F. PROPOSED DATA COLLECTION SURVEY

Marine Corps Security Cooperation Basic Course Survey

Survey Consent and Privacy Act Statement

AUTHORITY: The United States Marine Corps may collect the information requested in this study under the authority of 10 United States Code, Section 2358, "Research and Development Projects." In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), this notice informs you of the purpose, use, and confidentiality of this study.

PURPOSE: The purpose of the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Basic Course Survey is to collect information on the usage and general quality of selected Advisor training to aid MCSCG in training resource allocation and to identify areas requiring improvement.

ROUTINE USES: Data gathered through this study will be analyzed and results will be provided to MCSCG leadership and its training organizations responsible for individual and unit training used to prepare Marines for deployment.

DISCLOSURE: Participating in this survey is voluntary and you may choose at any time not to participate. There is no penalty for choosing not to participate.

CONFIDENTIALITY: We will NOT identify you, or attribute comments to any particular participant and we will NOT include your name or other personally identifiable information in our report. Likewise, we ask that you respect the confidential nature of this survey, by not identifying individual participants with comments made or heard during this session. We cannot provide "confidentiality" or "non-attribution," to a participant regarding information provided that involves criminal activity/behavior, or statements that pose a threat to yourself or others. Do NOT discuss or comment on classified or operationally sensitive information during this survey.

CONTACT: For further information about this study or your rights as a participant an e-mail and phone number will be provided, upon request, to contact MCSCG G3. Please indicate "MCSCG Training Survey" in your subject line.

General Information

	Month (MMM)	Year (YYYY)		Deployment lengths (in Months)
Deployment Start date				

	Must be consistent with the rest of your team						
Team Name							

	Team leaders	Driver	Security	Admin	Intel	Operations	Logistics	Comm
Your primary role								

	Completion of 3 week training	Post Deployment
Immediately after…		

	I MEF	II MEF	III MEF
Command			

	4 digit MOS
MOS	

	GED or Equivalent	High School	Associate's degree	Bachelor's degree	Master's Degree	Doctoral Degree
Education						

	Below 20	20-25	25-30	30-35	35-40	40-45	45-over
age							

	1-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	24-29	30-over
Years of Service							

	1-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	24-29	30-over
Team Size							

	E1-E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
Enlisted Rank							

	O1	O2	O3	O4	O5	O6
Officer Rank						

*PRIOR ENLIST OFFICERS FILL IN BOTH ENLISTED AND OFFICER

Section 1—Advisor Skills Module Classes

Operational Culture *1 hour class*—This class gives a familiarization in applying Operation Culture when dealing with an FSF with respect to SC.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Building Relationships and Rapport *2 hour class*—This class explains how to introduce a relationship with a FSF

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Cross-Culture Communications *2 hour class*—This class will show cultural differences, and communications verbally and non-verbally

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Recognize Cultural Stress *1 hour class*—Recognizing stressors in a physical and metaphysical environment, and ways to mitigate stressors.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Social Perspective Taking *2 hour class*—This class explains how to get past cultural nuances when dealing with an FSF.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Control Release of Info *1 hour class*—Familiarizes the student on the procedures of releasing information to an FSF

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Communicate Through an Interpreter *1 hour class*—Instructs the student on how to speak to an FSF through the use of an interpreter

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Interacting with Media *1 hour class*—Familiarizes students on how to respond to media inquires

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Law of War & ROE in an SC Environment *3 hour class*—Familiarizes students on the Laws of War and ROEs the team may face

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Legal Considerations in an SC Environment *3 hour class*—Defines the legal aspects and their implications while supporting an SC event.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Human Rights Awareness *1 Hour class*—This class gives the basics information of Human Rights violations and what to look out for while in country.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Section 2—Foreign Security Force Training Management Module Classes

Analyze & Design a Security Cooperation Training Plan *5 hour class*—This class gives a familiarization in Sourcing Documents and Training Plan Development.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Instructional Delivery Methods *8 hour class*—This class gives familiarization in lecture and non-lecture based instruction.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Develop a Security Cooperation Letter of Instruction *3 hour class*—Instructs how to develop an LOI based off the SCO's guidance

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Train the Foreign Security Force *2 hour class*—Focuses on the conduct and the evaluation phases of the SAT process and interaction with the FSF.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Range Operations *2 hour class*—RSO and Range Set up procedures

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Range Operations (PA) *1 hour class*—Practical Application of terrain mitigation and SDZ restrictions.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Range Operations (PE) *1 hour class*—Performance Evaluation of terrain mitigation and SDZ restrictions.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Operating Skills / Force Protection Module Classes *Hours of class*—Description

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Section 3—Operating Skills/Force Protection Module Classes

Counter Elicitation *1 hr*—Method used to mitigate elicitation in a foreign country.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Surveillance Awareness *3 hrs*—Provides an overview of types of surveillance, indicators of surveillance, and how to drive a FP route, and reporting suspicious activity.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Surveillance Awareness (PA) *8 hrs*—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Apprehension Avoidance *1 hr*—Provides methodology on how to gain SA and mitigate threats.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Apprehension Avoidance (PA) *6 hrs*—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

SERE B (+)*3 hrs*—Provides an overview of types of isolation, and how to mitigate interrogation.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

SERE B (+) (PA) *3 hrs*—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

(S) SERE 250 *4 hrs*—This class instructs the students to defeat personal restraints.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

(S) SERE 250 (PA) *4 hrs*—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Emergency Action Planning *2 hrs*—Provides overview on how to plan on overseas contingencies based on DOS and DOD guidance.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Team Level Operations Center *1 hr*—Familiarizes students on how to operate a team level COC.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Team Level Operations Center (PA) *.5 hrs*—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

High Risk Concealed Carry Course *32 hrs*—Provides overview on defensive mindset, concepts of concealed carry, and advanced pistol marksmanship.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

HRCC Brief *1hr*—This brief will teach the students the terms, different carries, and familiarizations they will utilize within the HRCC course.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Combat Lifesaver *12 hrs*—This class gives the basics of medical treatment; Airways, Breathing, and Circulatory.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Regional/Country Medical Threat Brief (LP) *1 hr*—This class will inform the student about medical threats that are common in their geographical AOR.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Assess Geographic Medical Requirements *1 hr*—Geographical specifics as to medical threats and requirements found in their geographical AOR.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Section 4—Additional Training

Advanced Tactical Driving (Contracted) *24 hrs*—This will familiarize students with the fundamentals of defensive driving.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Language *40 hrs*—This class, taught by CAOCL, teaches the students region specific language skills.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Foreign Weapons *Tailored*—The foreign weapons classes will be different per the area the SC Team will be going to. We currently have (19) different weapon systems that we can teach from.

	Don't Recall	N/A		Vary Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Neither	Fairly Dissatisfied	Vary Dissatisfied
Amply Classroom Time								
Instructor Delivery								
Class Organization								
Class was Relevant								

Comments:

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